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The dissertation focuses on two distinctive issues in pharmaceutical advertising.
One on the matching choices between advertisers and advertising agencies, and the other
on the e ect of paid-link advertising on consumer search for online pharmacies. The goal
of this dissertation is to empirically uncover the underlying economic mechanisms. More-
over, the analysis of matching problem provides new insights on the formation of vertical
relationships between clients and professional service agencies and has implications for
professional service market consolidations. And the examination of consumer searches for
pharmaceuticals online sheds lights on consumers’ concerns over quality and a ordability
of prescription drugs and draws attention on advertising regulation.
In the first two chapters, I focus on two essential features of the market for pro-
fessional services. One is the necessary mutual agreement in forming relationships, and
the other is that a client perceives conflict when hiring the same service agency as his
product market competitor. To incorporate these two features, I construct and estimate
a two-sided matching model and allow agents’ choices to depend on conflict. The results
show that conflict does indeed reduce match surplus, and the reduction is greater for a
pair of agents who have matched with each other in the previous period. Also, preserving
previously formed matches yields much higher surplus than forming new matches. Based
on these estimates, I conduct a counterfactual exercise to illustrate the e ect of conflict
on allocation of matches and another counterfactual exercise to illustrate the e ect of a
merger between advertising agencies on market equilibrium.
In the third chapter, coauthored with Matthew Chesnes and Ginger Jin, we examine
how government’s sudden ban of foreign online pharmacies from paid search on Google
and other search engines changes consumer searches for the banned websites. Using click-
through data from comScore, we find that non-NABP-certified pharmacies receive fewer
clicks after the ban, and this e ect is heterogenous. In particular, pharmacies not certified
by the NABP but certified by other sources, referred to as tier-B sites, experience a
reduction in total clicks, and some of their lost paid clicks are replaced by organic clicks.
These results have implications for the change in consumer search cost and health concern.
ESSAYS ON PHARMACEUTICAL ADVERTISING
by
Weijia Dai
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment




Professor Ginger G. Jin, Chair
Professor Andrew Sweeting, Co-Chair







To my parents, L. Dai and S. Xiang.
ii
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I wish to express my deep gratitude to my advisor Professor
Ginger Jin. My dissertation would not have been possible without her most generous
support and advice. I greatly appreciate all her contributions of time and ideas to make
my Ph.D. experience productive and stimulating. I would also like to thank my co-
advisor Professor Andrew Sweeting for his immeasurable help on my dissertation. I am
very grateful of his willingness to helping me solve my dissertation related questions at all
times, and I very much appreciated that he guided me to overcome the major di culties
in the first two chapters of my dissertation with his remarkable intellectual insights.
For this dissertation, thanks are due to my dissertation committee members, Pro-
fessor David Godes, Professor Roger Betancourt, and Professor Peter Cramton, for their
invaluable time, interest, and guidance.
For the third chapter of the dissertation, I am especially grateful for my coauthor
Dr. Matthew Chesnes for the wonderful experience of working together with him.
My colleagues at the department of economics have made my graduate study and
work a memorable experience and have provided me with helpful comments on my disser-
tation. I have benefited from the discussion with Larry Ausubel, Roger Betancourt, Ron
Chan, Peter Cramton, Jingting Fan, Haishan Yuan, Soohyung (Soo) Lee, Ethan Kaplan,
Lixin Tang, Lesley Turner, Shulin Wee, Bobby Zhou, Ben Zou, and seminar participants
at the and department of economics and Robert Smith School of Business.
This dissertation has also been benefited greatly from the constructive comments
and suggestions made by Panle Jia Barwick, Jason Chan, Jeremy Fox, Qiang Fu, Matthew
Gentzkow, Avi Goldfarb, Andrew Hagiu, Bart Hamilton, Ben Handel, John Hatfield,
Daniel Hosken, Susumu Imai, Karam Kang, Bying-Cheol Kim, Michael Luca, Shiko
Maruyama, Fiona Scott Morton, Minjae Song, William Vogt, Weng Xi and attendants
iii
at the 2013 WHITE Conference, the 2013 and 2014 Southern Economics Association An-
nual Conference and the 2014 American Economic Association Conference.
For the data and institutional knowledge, I would like to thank George Chressanthis
for suggesting the data sources, and Robert Girondi from the Fox School of Business, Drew
Guiteras from McKinney, Prasun Subedi from Pfizer for providing institutional detail on
advertising agencies and pharmaceutical marketing.
I gratefully acknowledge the funding sources that made my dissertation work possi-
ble. I would like to acknowledge financial support from the department of Economics for





Chapter 1 – Matching with Conflicts: An Application to the Advertising Industry 5
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 The Advertising Agency Business and the Concern of Conflict . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 A Two-Sided Matching Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.1 Model Setup and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.2 Equilibrium Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 Model Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Chapter 2 – An Empirical Examination of Matching Between Pharmaceutical Adver-
tisers and Advertising Agencies 22
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2 Market Description and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2.1 Agency Market for Pharmaceutical Advertisers . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2.2 Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2.3 Sample Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2.4 Market Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3 Model Estimation and Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3.1 Maximum Score Estimator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3.2 Model Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3.3 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.4 The Impact of Conflict on Surplus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4.1 Descriptive Evidence on Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4.2 Maximum Score Estimates of Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.5 Counterfactual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5.1 Conflict Crowds Out Matches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.5.2 Error Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5.3 The Impact of Conflict on Market Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.5.4 The Impact of Merger on Market Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.7 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Chapter 3 – Consumer Protection or Consumer Frustration? The Impact of Banning
Foreign Pharmacies from Sponsored Search 70
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2.1 The Online Market of Prescription Drugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2.2 Google Policy on Online Pharmacies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.3 Conceptual and Econometric Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4 Data Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.4.1 Click and Search Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.4.2 Query List and Website Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.5 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.6 Regression Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
v
3.6.1 Total Clicks from All Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.6.2 A Closer Look at Pharmacy Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.6.3 Heterogeneous E ects of Drug Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.8 Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109




1 Statistics on Matching Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2 Turnover of Matches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3 Summary Statistics of Advertising Agency and Drug Characteristics . . . . 59
4 Probability of Matching for A Drug . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5 Probability of Matching for An Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
6 Types of Pairwise Deviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
7 Descriptive Regression: Probability of a Forming Match . . . . . . . . . . . 63
8 Descriptive Regression: Heterogeneous E ect of Previously Matching Re-
lationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
9 Baseline Maximum Score Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
10 Maximum Score Estimates: Controlling for Heterogeneous E ect of Matcht≠1 66
11 Parameters in Counterfactual Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
12 Counterfactual: The Impact of Conflict on Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . 68
13 Counterfactual: The Impact of Mergers on Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . 69
14 List of Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
15 Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
16 Query List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
17 Query Statistics: Overall Number of Searches and Clicks . . . . . . . . . . 116
18 Pharmacy Website Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
19 Regression Results: Clicks on Online Pharmacy Websites (from All Queries) 118
20 Regression Results: Searchers and Searches of Pharmacy Queries . . . . . . 119
21 Regression Results: Total Clicks on Online Pharmacy Websites (from Phar-
macy Queries) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
22 Regression Results: Online Pharmacy Clicks from H-Drug Vs. L-Drug
Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
23 Regression Results: Online Pharmacies Clicks from Lifestyle Vs. Non-
lifestyle Drug Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
24 Regression Results: Online Pharmacy Clicks from Chronic Vs. Non-chronic
Drugs Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
A1 Examples of H-Drugs and L-Drugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
A2 Examples of Lifestyle and Non-Lifestyle Drugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
A3 Examples of Chronic and Non-Chronic Drugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
vii
List of Figures
1 Google Search Screenshot, Before the Ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
2 Google Search Screenshot, After the Ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3 Example ComScore Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4 Searchers and Searches by Broad Query Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5 Clicks On Pharmacy Websites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6 Pharmacy Searches by Query Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
viii
Introduction
The dissertation studies two factors in the advertising production process, choice of ad-
vertising agencies and consumer response to paid link advertisements on search engines.
The former concerns whether an advertiser can match with a desirable advertising agency,
and the latter determines if consumers are responsive to the form of advertisement they
are exposed to.
Advertising is often outsourced to one or several advertising agencies that provide
both creative and media buying services. While outsourcing advertising is a common
practice, product market competitors often want to avoid the conflict of using the same
advertising agency. At the same time, since it is costly for advertising agencies to ensure
confidentiality when contracting with product market competitors, they may also avoid
serving direct competitors simultaneously. Given the limited number of advertising agen-
cies that specialize in a particular type of product category, conflict a ects the allocation
of matches in the advertising market.
The goal of the first two chapters is to model the choice problem, to use a revealed
preference approach to back out the e ect of conflict on agents’ preferences, and to examine
how the existence of conflict impacts the overall allocation of contracts. Moreover, since
conflict is determined by the relationship structure in the market, in Chapter 2, I also
examine how a change in market structure, such as a merger between advertising agencies,
changes the market equilibrium.
The nature of the choice problem described above suggests that we need to account
for the interdependence of decisions made by both sides of the market, and it is important
to take into account all market participants. This di ers from the previous literature that
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ignores the strategy interdependence and the two-sidedness of the decision process (Rogan
(2013); Asker & Ljungqvist (2010); Aobdia (2012)).
To solve this problem, Chapter 1 lays out a two-sided matching the model that
analyzes the relationship choices and allow for negative externality generated by conflict.
Chapter 2 estimates the latent matching surplus function using observed matches between
pharmaceutical advertisers and advertising agencies. After backing out the preference
parameter, in Chapter 2, I am able to simulate the market equilibrium e ect of conflict
and the e ect of a merger between the advertising agencies.
Drug advertising is particularly suited to a study of agency-client relationships since
there is a clear definition of product market competition by therapeutic class. Also, pre-
scription drug advertisers are important clients for the advertising agencies, contributing
roughly 10% of total agency revenue.
I find that conflict is costly to matching relationships, and crowds out low return
matches in the market. The merger of advertising agencies further reduces choice alterna-
tives of agencies and in general reduces total surplus in the market. Although this study
does not explicitly examine commissions paid to advertising agencies, the fact that merger
significantly reduces the substitution of agencies due to conflict has important implications
for antitrust policy. This study is a first attempt to directly model the e ect of conflict
on agent preferences and the mechanism of conflict in a ecting matching allocation in
the market. While I focus on a particular set of agents, namely advertising agencies and
their pharmaceutical clients, there are many more markets where vertical relationships
can be characterized by two-sided decisions and are suitable to be analyzed in a matching
framework.
Chapter 3 studies consumer response to paid link advertisements on search engines.
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Search engine is one major gateway for consumers to find information, hence advertisers
bid on paid links of relevant queries (keywords) in the hope that their links will be seen and
clicked by consumers. This form of advertising often attracts online retailers, including
foreign pharmacies that place paid links and directly sell pharmaceuticals to US consumers
online. The high drug price in the US makes buying online from foreign pharmacies an
attractive option for US consumers and makes it appealing for foreign pharmacies to reach
US consumers through online paid link advertisements.
The concern has since grown because poor online prescription drugs quality may
lead to adverse health outcomes. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) prohibits
the importation of unapproved drugs into the US, and the National Association of Boards
of Pharmacy (NABP) emphasizes their illegality and cites examples of unsafe drugs from
rogue pharmacies. Because of heightened concern to protect consumers, Google agreed
to ban non-NABP-certified pharmacies from their sponsored search listings in February
2010 and settled with the Department of Justice (DOJ) in August 2011. This creates an
exogenous change to the paid-link advertisements consumers are able to see through online
searches, and we study how the ban on non-NABP-certified pharmacies from sponsored
search listings a ects consumer search on the Internet.
Using click-through data from comScore, we find that non-NABP-certified phar-
macies receive fewer clicks after the ban, and this e ect is heterogeneous. In particular,
pharmacies not certified by the NABP but certified by other sources – referred to as tier-B
sites – experience a reduction in total clicks, and some of their lost paid clicks are replaced
by organic clicks. These e ects do not change significantly after the DOJ settlement. In
contrast, pharmacies not certified by any of the four major certification agencies – re-
ferred to as tier-C sites – su er a greater reduction in both paid and organic clicks, and
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the reduction was exacerbated after the DOJ settlement. These results suggest that the
ban has increased search cost for tier-B sites, but at least some consumers overcome the
increased search cost by switching from paid to organic links. In addition to search cost,
the ban may have increased health concerns for tier-C sites and discouraged consumers
from reaching them via both paid and organic links.
The remainder of this dissertation is divided as follows. Chapter 1 presents the
matching model and its challenges to define stable equilibrium when externality exists. In
doing so, Chapter 1 articulates the assumptions made on the model and their implications.
Chapter 2 first estimates the model using data on matches formed by pharmaceutical ad-
vertisers and advertising agencies, and then uses the estimated parameters to simulate
matching allocations when market structure changes. Lastly, Chapter 3 studies how con-
sumer find information on the internet by examining consumer search and click responses
after a ban of paid link advertisements from foreign pharmacies on US search engines.
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Chapter 1 – Matching with Conflicts: An Application to the Adver-
tising Industry
1.1 Introduction
In many professional service markets, such as auditing, advertising, banking, and consult-
ing, clients may prefer that the service agency they work with does not work for their
product market competitors. This is mainly due to concerns about conflicts of interest.
For example, strategically important information may be leaked to competitors, or the act
of maintaining relationships with conflicting clients may lower the service agency’s perfor-
mance. In the advertising industry, an oft-cited example is that of Colgate-Palmolive, who
terminated its long-standing relationship with Saatchi and Saatchi when the advertising
agency started to work for Procter & Gamble following a merger.1 To address potential
conflict, the industry association American Association of Advertising Agencies (4A’s) has
advised advertising agencies to be vigilant in protecting clients’ confidential information
either by avoiding simultaneously serving clients who compete head-to-head or by setting
up information firewalls (so called “Chinese walls”) to actively prevent information leakage
within the agency.2
Conflict lowers expected surplus of relationships between service agencies and clients
and a ects both sides’ choices of who to contract with. The goal of the first two chapters
1Advertising agencies Saatchi & Saatchi and Ted Bates merged in 1987. Before their merger, Colgate-
Palmolive hired Saatchi & Saatchi, and Procter & Gamble hired Ted Bates. The merger between the two
agencies brought Colgate- Palmolive and Procter & Gamble under the same roof and led to the immediate
departure of Colgate-Palmolive (Siman 1989; Goldman 1997). In service industries, a merger of top service
agencies with broad client bases almost inevitably leads to competition overlap among their clients. For
example, the merger between Arthur Young and Ernst & Whinney in 1989 brought their clients PepsiCo
and Coca-Cola together, resulting in Arthur Young’s resignation from PepsiCo’s contract. It is an aphorism
within the service industry that secrets are harder to keep in advertising agencies (The Economist 1997).
2See American Association of Advertising Agencies (2009), “Confidentiality Of Marketing Services
Information”. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/hHGQ9i
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is to model the contract choice problem, to estimate the e ect of conflict on agents’
preferences, and to quantify how the existence of conflict impacts the overall allocation of
contracts. Moreover, since conflict is determined by relationship structure in the market, I
examine how a change to the market structure, such as a merger between service agencies,
changes the market equilibrium.
Compared to the classical matching literature, my setting is non-standard in two
ways. First, conflict introduces an externality of one player’s matching choice on other
players’ preferences.3 Second, a many-to-many matching model is necessary as both drug
advertisers and advertising agencies commonly match with multiple partners. In order to
obtain a stable equilibrium solution when advertising agencies’ preferences may not be
substitutable, I made an assumption that drug advertisers do not face a binding capacity
constraint in terms of how many matches they can form in a specific year. This assumption
implies that a drug advertiser’s decision to match with each agency is independent and
leads to stable equilibrium. However, I am able to maintain the feature that the number
of agencies a drug advertiser eventually hires is still limited since the match value of a
drug-agency pair must overcome a fixed cost of signing up a contract and the cost of
conflict if conflict exists. There is no explicit capacity constraint for advertising agencies
in my model either, but since conflict increases the cost to match with another drug in the
same therapeutic class, this negative externality is similar to a capacity constraint specific
to the class.4 The model yields the result that the equilibrium can be characterized by
3The negative externality in this model directly a ects agents’ preferences. This is di erent from the
externality in the typical matching models in which capacity constraint places a negative externality on
agents’ choice set.
4More strictly speaking, since I assume that conflict cost does not depend on the number of drugs in
a conflicting relationship, negative externality in my model arises when the number of drugs an agency
serves in a therapeutic class rises from one to two. But when an agency already has two conflicting clients,
adding the third client in the therapeutic class only creates the conflict cost to the extra match itself, and
does not impose a negative externality to existing matches.
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pairwise deviations that are independent of transfers made between contracting parties.
This allows me to identify the surplus function using only information on matches.
A two-sided model with conflict helps us better understand the role of conflict
in contractual relationships. Rogan (2013), Asker & Ljungqvist (2010), Aobdia (2012)
model and identify conflict from clients’ switching behavior when their service agencies
are involved in exogenous mergers. Such an identification strategy ignores the fact that all
clients’ contracting decisions, whether or not they are currently in a contract, are a ected
by the market structure change. I am able to incorporate the market-wide interdependency
through conflicts. In particular, I simulate market equilibrium when conflict cost is reduced
to zero and when mergers reduce the number of service agencies in the market. My findings
are consistent with Asker & Ljungqvist (2010) in that conflict is costly for matches, and
mergers reduce the number of matches formed in the market. My work also complements
Asker & Ljungqvist (2010) by constructing a counterfactual that shows the magnitude
of equilibrium e ect of a change to the market structure on all agents in the market, no
matter whether they have a contract with the merging agencies or not at the time of
merger.
My work has important implications for competitiveness of professional service mar-
kets, especially when the number of viable service agencies is limited for each type of client
due to client-required experience and expertise. A typical antitrust analysis concerns
whether a merger may generate price ine ciency because consumers have fewer suppliers
to choose from. Later in Chapter 2, I show that a merger between professional service
providers can exacerbate conflict of interest among clients and further limit a client’s choice
set. Whether this warrants additional antitrust concern depends on the pre-merger mar-
ket structure and additional knowledge of the mechanism by which matches and payments
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are negotiated.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In the next section, I describe
background of the advertising agency industry and explain the dataset I construct for this
study. In section 3, I explain the matching model and characterize the model equilibrium.
In sections 4, I discuss my model elements and compares them to the classic two-sided
matching models.
1.2 The Advertising Agency Business and the Concern of Conflict
Advertising agencies provide a number of professional services to clients, including plan-
ning and creating advertising content, delivering finished creative content to consumers
through media outlets, advising clients on overall marketing and branding strategies. In
fact, with a total US revenue of $35.6 billion in 2012,5 advertising agencies are in charge of
almost all of the advertising activities of the majority of large advertisers, an arrangement
that has existed since the 1920s (Mohammad et al., 2012). Among the 1,746 firms who
spend more than $1 million annually on advertising and responded to the 2003 Advertising
Age survey, 86% outsource all of their advertising services to advertising agencies (Horsky,
2006). This figure that is lower for advertisers with smaller advertising budgets. And in
the advertising industry, larger advertising agencies dominate: in 2003, advertisers spent
$245 billion on advertising in the US, and 61% of the spending are billed through the
largest 1000 advertising agencies (Advertising Age 2004).6
Client concerns about conflict have long been recognized in the advertising industry.
5See Advertising Age (2013). Retrieved from http://adage.com/article/agency-news/digital-media-
drive-u-s-agency-revenue/241114/
6Billing is the total amount of marketing dollars given to the advertising agencies to spend for the
advertisers.
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One widely documented case was the merger between Saatchi & Saatchi and Ted Bates
in the late 1980s. In this merger, the two agencies lost accounts worth more than $300
million, and at least one of the clients in a conflict relationship with his product market
competitors dismissed the agency (Siman, 1989). The 4A’s has also issued conflict policy
guidelines that cautions “head-to-head conflict at the brand or category level”.7
To date, conflict continues to attract attention in agency merger announcements,
since mergers may directly bring conflicting clients into the same agency. The impor-
tance of client conflicts came to light again when Publicis and Omnicom, the second and
third largest advertising holding companies ranked by 2012 revenue, announced plans to
merge in July 2013. Given the size of these advertising agency holding companies, the
potential competition overlap among clients was big. The proposed Publicis-Omnicom
merger brought together high-profile competing advertisers, such as PepsiCo and Coca-
Cola, Volkswagen and Mercedes, General Motors and Toyota, and AT&T and Verizon.8
The merger was ultimately cancelled due to a variety of reasons, but the CEO of Publicis
Maurice Levy mentioned part of the reason be the merger diverts agencies’ attention to
“best serve our clients”. Inspired by this merger event, I will analyze the impact of a hypo-
thetical Publicis-Omnicom merger on allocation of matches for pharmaceutical advertisers
in the counterfactual exercise.
The costs of conflict arise from three main sources: clients concern about information
leakage, the cost to the agency of maintaining client relationships when conflict occurs
(Asker & Ljungqvist (2010), Aobdia (2012)), and the disinclination of conflicting clients
or forgo access to an agency’s limited product-specific specialty resources (e.g., experts,
7See American Association of Advertising Agencies (2009), “Conflict Policy Guidelines”. Retrieved from
http://www.aaaa.org/agency/compensation/positionpapers/pages/070700_conflict.aspx




Advertising agencies access clients’ confidential business information and marketing
plans and act on their behalf to execute their advertising strategy. Advertising agencies’
failure to protect clients’ confidential marketing plans may hinder advertising e ective-
ness, so clients have the expectation that agencies will carefully guard their confidential
information. The promise to prevent client information from leaking becomes particularly
fragile when a client shares the same advertising agency as his product market competi-
tors. One reason is that the information barrier within an organization is much lower than
across organizations. The other reason is strategic: when there is a large prospective gain
for an advertising agency that uses one client’s marketing strategy to benefit his competi-
tor, the agency may have an incentive problem in committing to protect confidential client
information.
The second conflict concern is the negative impact on an advertising agency’s perfor-
mance when it is trying to maintain relationships with conflicting clients. One direct cost
is the “Chinese wall” advertising agencies build to serve conflicting clients. This includes
creating separate o ce spaces, separate sta s, and separate communication channels to
reduce communication between teams of employees who work on competing accounts. An-
other indirect cost is that the agency may sacrifice e ciency for fairness where the agency
balance resources devoted to competing clients.9 Sometimes, maintaining such conflicting
relationships is so costly that the agency is willing to let the less valuable client go.10
9Anecdotal evidence can be seen in discussions of industry magazines. Marc Brownstein, president of
the Brownstein Group, whose clients includes IKEA, eBay, and Comcast mentioned in the article he writes
for the Advertising Age magazine that serving competing clients at the same time is “utopian”. He argues
that maintaining relationships with competing clients and keeping every party happy is very hard. See
Advertising Age (2012), “Can We, Should We, Serve Competing Clients at the Same Time”. Retrieved
from http://adage.com/article/small-agency-diary/serve-competing-clients-time/235777/
10In 2012, Omnicom resigned its contract with Farmers Insurance just weeks after winning the account
when its other client State Farm, “a much bigger client by marketing spending”, learned about Omnicom’s
new relationship with Farmers. See Advertising Age (2012), “Farmers Insurance, Omnicom’s PHD Part
Ways Due to Client Conflict”. Retrieved from http://adage.com/article/agency-news/farmers-insurance-
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Conflict can also occur when clients compete for advertising agency’s market-specific
resources. For example, if an agency has only one expert in the client’s field and can assign
that expert to only one client due to the “Chinese wall,” clients in conflict matched with
the agency should expect a lower chance that they will benefit from access to that expert.
1.3 A Two-Sided Matching Model
To allow both drug advertisers and advertising agencies to choose whether to sign a con-
tract, I analyze their choice problem using a two-sided matching model. Because advertis-
ing agency commissions are negotiated in the contracting process, I allow side payments
to be endogenously determined in the matching game. In this section, I outline the model
and necessary assumptions, and I then establish that the socially optimal allocation be-
longs to the set of pairwise stable equilibrium. Using pairwise stable equilibrium, I will
derive conditions that characterize the equilibrium and use them to identify and estimate
the model.
1.3.1 Model Setup and Assumptions
I define a matching market as a treatment class in a given year in which drugs and
advertising agencies seek matches. I assume that each side of the market fully observes
the characteristics and preference shocks of all drugs and agencies. Each drug and agency
maximizes its own surplus for the current period. I also assume that agency decisions are
independent across treatment classes. Because these two assumptions imply independence
omnicom-s-phd-part-ways-due-conflict/237158/
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of agent decisions across markets, I will focus on a single market in the following analysis.
There are m drugs in the market, indexed by i = 1, .., m œ I and n advertising
agencies, indexed by j = 1, .., n œ J . Each drug can hire multiple agencies and each
agency can serve multiple drugs. A matching µ is a mapping from the set I fi J into the
set of all subsets of I fi J , where µ(i) œ 2J and µ(j) œ 2I , and i œ µ(j) if and only if
j œ µ(i). Denote M as the set of all possible matchings.
Denote the transfer that a drug i pays to an agency j as tij , I can write the drug
and agency surpluses as
Si(i, j|µ) = y(Xi, Zj) ≠ Ÿf ≠ tij + ‘iij (1)
Sj(i, j|µ) = ≠1(|µj | > 1)Ÿc + tij + ‘jij (2)
where y(Xi, Zj) is the expected return that drug i yields from advertising agency j’s
service based on observed drug characteristics Xi and agency characteristics Zj . Ÿf is
the fixed cost associated with establishing a match, which I assume to be common across
all matches. For simplicity, I will refer to y(Xi, Zj) as the “return of a match”, and to
y(Xi, Zj) ≠ Ÿf as the “net return of a match”. Ÿc is the cost incurred when the pair (i, j)
is involved in a client conflict. I assume Ÿc is constant for any matched pair involved in
a conflict. Conflict arises when an agency serves two or more drugs in the same market,
that is, if |µj | > 1. In the surplus function, I express that the conflict cost accrues to
the agencies only for illustration; in the equilibrium I define, matching will depend only
on the total net surplus, not on which side pays the conflict cost. ‘iij and ‘
j
ij are match
specific preference shocks observable to all agents in the market, and shocks to drugs and
to agencies are each distributed i.i.d across all possible match pairs.
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I make four modeling assumptions as follows:
Assumption 1 Each drug and agency’s total surplus is a simple summation of








More specifically, the model assumes that, for each drug, there are no complemen-
tarities among the set of agencies it hires. In particular, drug preference is responsive and
satisfies substitutability given matching allocation of its competitors. However, preference
of advertising agencies is not substitutable,11 which may challenge the existence of a stable
equilibrium in a usual matching setting.
Assumption 2 When agents make matching decisions, externalities arise only
through client conflict.
It is common to expect that drug advertisers’ surpluses may be influenced by ex-
ternalities arising from product market competition. For example, one drug’s advertising
e ort may a ect his competitors’ product revenue. This model does not preclude this
type of externality, but it assumes that this type of externality does not interact with the
characteristics and identity of the advertising agency, and hence does not a ect matching
choices. More specifically, think of the overall drug-agency matching and advertising pro-
duction process as a two-stage game. In the first stage, drugs and agencies take preference
draws, form expectations about the returns of possible matching opportunities, and decide
11Consider the following example in which agent preference fails substitutability. For illustration, let
advertising agencies have full bargaining power and let drugs obtain reservation value. Assume that an
advertising agency obtains net return of 10, 4, 4 with drug D1 , D2 and D3, and that the conflict cost is
2.5 for each match. If the agency is given the set {D1, D2}, it will choose to match with D1 alone, which
gives a surplus of 10, rather than matching with both drugs, which gives a total surplus of 9. When given
the set {D1, D2, D3}, the agency will choose the full set of drugs, which yields a surplus of 10.5. Hence
the {D1, D2} is chosen only when D3 is chosen.
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what contracts to propose and to accept to maximize their expected surplus. In the second
stage, the matches are formed and each drug’s advertising strategy is determined based on
his competitor’s strategies. However, I assume that strategic interactions between drugs
in the second stage are not a ected by the first-stage hiring decisions. This assumption
is made based on the literature that argues that relational characteristics, such as iden-
tity and impression, are important in determining relationships (Morgan & Hunt (1994),
Alvesson (1994)). This is not surprising, given that the e ectiveness of an advertising
agency is hard to predict. So choices made at the matching stage can be perceived as
drugs and agencies seeking matches that minimize the cost of doing business.
Assumption 3 The capacity constraints for both drugs and advertising agencies
do not bind.
Given that the number of matching opportunities that yield positive returns is
limited in a market, this assumption suggests that drugs and advertising agencies are
willing to add a match as long as the additional match increases the total surplus of
the agent. In fact, I can relax this assumption to allow the market-specific capacity
constraint for advertising agencies to bind since conflict cost is a form of constraint on an
advertising agency’s ability to take on more drugs in given market. On the drug side, a
capacity constraint can appear as an increasing cost for the drug to match with additional
advertising agencies. I estimate a version of the model that allows a matching cost to
increase as a drug takes on additional agencies. The result shows that, for a given drug,
each additional match slightly reduces, rather than increases, the matching cost, but the
magnitudes are very small, suggesting that capacity constraint for drugs is unlikely to
bind.
Assumption 4 The opportunity cost of forming a match is R for drugs, and zero
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for advertising agencies.
Note that the opportunity cost of forming a match in this situation compares a drug
and an agency’s decision to take or leave each matching opportunity. This is di erent from
the “acceptance” notion that compares the agent’s decision to participate in the matching
market with the decision to stay out.
1.3.2 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, I define the socially optimal allocation, and show that it is pairwise stable
given my model setting.
For notation compactness, I follow contract notations in Hatfield and Milgrom
(2005). Denote a bilateral contract between an drug-agency pair (i, j) as aij = ((i, j), tij).
aij contains two elements. The first element describes the match between a pair of agents
from each disjoint set that signs the contract, aI = i and aJ = j, where it corresponds to
the prior notation of i œ µ(j) and j œ µ(i). The second element describes the transfer tij
paid from drug i to agency j. Only one contract can be signed between i and j. An market
allocation A is a collection of contracts that specify matching allocation over all agents
and a set of transfers, A © I ◊ J ◊ T . Given a set of contracts A µ A, I denote Chi(A) as
the most preferred subset of contracts chosen by drug i among contracts that names i as
a partner (aI = i), and I denote Chj(A) as the most preferred subset of contracts chosen
by agency j among contracts with aJ = j.
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Definition 1 A socially optimal allocation is a matching µ œ M that maximizes the












This concept only considers the total surplus generated from each match, ignoring
any transfers designated in the contact. Note also that, in the market I define, there is
no capacity constraint on how many matches an agent can obtain. However, the socially
optimal allocation does not imply that every possible pair of matches will be formed.
Adding an additional match is costly for two reasons. The first cost is the cost of forming
a match (Ÿf ), common to all matches. The second cost is the cost of conflict if an additional
match increases the amount of conflict in the market. So at the socially optimal allocation,
any additional match will only reduce the total surplus.
Definition 2 A set of contracts A µ A constitutes a pairwise stable equilibrium if
(i) ChI(A) = ChJ(A) = A, and
(ii) there does not exist a drug i and an agency jÕ and a new contract aÕ =
((i, jÕ), tijÕ), aÕ ”œ Chi(A), such thataÕ œ Chi(A fi aÕ) µ ChJ(A fi aÕ), and
(iii) and there does not exist an advertising agency j and a set of contracts aÕÕ =
((iÕ, j), tiÕj), aÕÕ ”= Chj(A) such that
aÕÕ œ Chj(A fi aÕÕ) µ ChI(A fi aÕÕ).
Condition (i) for the pairwise stable equilibrium says that the equilibrium set of
contract A is the best subset of contracts among those assigned to them in A, or that
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each agent is unwilling to drop the contract(s) it has at hand according to allocation A.
Conditions (ii) and (iii) stipulate that, given allocation A, an agent cannot construct a
new contract with an opponent it is not contracting with that makes the agent strictly
better o  and all other agents weakly better o .
Claim Given the above-defined surplus function S and all possible matchings M, if a
matching µú is socially optimal, there exists a set of contracts A µ A that is pairwise
stable and implements µú.
Proof Assume that advertising agencies have full bargaining power. The proof will
proceed as follows: Given a matching µ, I will show that the set of transfers is endogenously
determined by the bargaining rule, so each allocation A is reduced to a matching µ and the
agent surplus can be written as a function of matching µ. I will then prove by contradiction
that the social stable allocation µú is pairwise stable.
Since drugs are not capacity constrained and they evaluate contracts with di erent
advertising agencies independently, when agencies have full bargaining power, each drug
will accept a contract as far as its surplus is higher than that drug’s reservation value for
a contract, R. So for a given matching µ, Si = R and Sj =
q
iœµ(j) S(i, j) ≠ |µj |R.








dropping iÕ from µ(j) improves surplus for j and does not a ect other agents’ payo s, so
µú is not socially optimal.
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If µú violates assumption (ii), then there exists a pair (iÕ, j), for which iÕ ”œ µ(j) and
S(iÕ, j) = R,
ÿ
iœµ(j)fiiÕ
S(i, j) ≠ (|µj | + 1)R >
ÿ
iœµ(j)
S(i, j) ≠ |µj |R.
By adding (iÕ, j) to the current allocation µú, the social total surplus strictly increases,
and therefore, µú is not socially optimal. Hence by contradiction, there exists a transfer
schedule such that the socially optimal allocation is pairwise stable. ⇤
One of the key assumptions that leads me to this simple proof is that drug advertisers
have no binding capacity constraint and make independent decisions on forming matches
with each agency. This assumption is tested and justified in the empirical section in the
second chapter.
1.4 Model Discussions
To determine key characteristics of drug and advertising agency matching market,
I allow features of the matching model to di er from canonical models of matching with
transfers (Shapley & Shubik, 1971) and matching with contracts (Kelso Jr & Crawford
(1982); Hatfield & Milgrom (2005)). In order to maintain model stability and obtain
identification from the data I observe, I make the simplification assumptions discussed in
the last section. Next, I will discuss further some of the model assumptions and their
implications.
Firstly, in classical matching models, substitutability is the key concept that allows
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characterization of the one-to-one and many-to-one stable matchings by the fix-point set,
and hence by a lattice (Adachi (2000); Hatfield & Milgrom (2005)), and it is also extended
into the many-to-many settings (Echenique & Oviedo, 2004). In my model, substitutability
fails because of the simple assumption that conflict cost does not change with the number of
matches in the conflicting relationship. One could argue for defining the conflict cost such
that it increases at some minimum rate when the number of conflicting drugs matching
with an advertising agency increases. However, in an unreported version of the estimation,
I allow the conflict cost for each drug in the conflicting relationship to rise when the
number of conflicting drugs increases. The coe cient on the change of conflict cost is not
significant, which rejects the above argument. Examples in the literature show that the
situations in which stability fails in the absence of substitutability occur when agents on
both sides of the market are capacity-constrained.12 Lifting capacity constraint solves the
problem since it makes an agent’s decisions to match with each opponent independent.
This does not get rid of all interesting externalities in the market, because advertising
agency’s decisions of which drugs to take are not independent because of the conflict.
Since transfers are not observed in the model, the concept of a socially optimal
allocation allows me to identify preferences by focusing only on the matching allocation.
Assuming away capacity constraints also plays a role in identifying the cost of conflict
without needing transfer information. This will become clear when I discuss the model
identification.
12The singular preference is the key where stability fails in the example given by Hatfield & Mil-
grom (2005). Assume that there are two hospitals h1, h2 and two drugs d1, d2. Preference of h1
fails substitutability that {d1, d2} ºh1 {d1} ºh1 ÿ ºh1 d2, assume also that h2 has singular prefer-
ence and {d2} ºh2 {d1} ºh2 ÿ. Both doctors have singular preference: {h2} ºd1 {h1} ºd1 ÿ and
{h1} ºd2 {h2} ºd2 ÿ. Assume a matching A1 in which both d1 and d2 are matched with h1, and h2 is
unmatched. The pair (d1, h2) can block A1, and forms the new matching A2 in which d1 is matched with
h2 and both d2 and h1 are unmatched. The pair (d2, h2) blocks A2 and form a matching A3 in which d2
and h2 are matched and d1 and h1 are matched. The pair (d2, h1) blocks A3 and the matching is back to
A1. Hence stable matching does not exist.
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Secondly, note that the above proof shows that socially optimal matching can be
characterized by pairwise stable equilibrium. However, socially optimal matching is not
the only pairwise stable equilibrium. For example, in the non-substitutability example I
gave in according to footnote 11, advertising agency j’s preference is D1 = Chj(D1, D2),
D1 = Chj(D1, D3) and (D1, D2, D3) = Chj(D1, D2, D3). Agency j’s matching with D1
is pairwise stable since neither pairwise deviation between (Aj , D2) or (Aj , D3) can block
(Aj , D1), but it is not socially optimal. However, socially optimal matching is setwise
stable since D2 and D3 together can block (Aj , D1). Although non-unique pairwise stable
equilibrium can arise in this model, I assume that the socially optimal allocation is reached
since it is robust to setwise deviations.
Thirdly, another feature of the model that arises from conflict externality is that
a drug advertiser has preferences not only about the contracts that are assigned to it,
but also about contracts that are assigned to its competitors. Sasaki & Toda (1996) and
Hafalir (2007) point out that in a matching game with negative externalities, the outcome
of a stable equilibrium depends on agents’ expectation of blocking matching allocations.
In the stability definition above, I have made the behavioral assumption that each agent
expects that other matches will remain the same if it deviates.
Fourthly, the static model has two implications. One is that drug advertisers only
try to maximize the current period’s surplus, and the other is that drugs and agencies will
not make negative transfer payments or demand payments that exceed the surplus of the
match.
Lastly, although I assume that agencies have full bargaining power in the proof of
results, there exist other mechanisms that could produce socially optimal matching. For
example, in the conclusion section, I will discuss a mechanism by which drugs propose
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matches and transfers that also reach the socially optimal equilibrium. Such mechanisms
resemble the market practice more closely.
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Chapter 2 – An Empirical Examination of Matching Between Phar-
maceutical Advertisers and Advertising Agencies
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I investigate the importance of conflict in the context of advertising
agencies working for prescription drug advertisers. Drug advertising is particularly suited
to a study of agency-client relationships for several reasons. First, prescription drug
advertisers are important clients for the advertising agencies, contributing roughly 10% of
total agency revenue. Second, there is a clear definition of product market competition by
therapeutic class. Third, although many pharmaceutical companies produce more than
one drug, advertising agencies chosen for di erent drugs within the same pharmaceutical
company are often scattered. Conversations with the marketing directors of Pfizer and
AstraZeneca suggest that advertising decisions are made independently by the marketing
team of each drug, which allows me to assume that advertising agency choices are made
at the drug level.
Based on a new dataset I construct of agency-drug relationships from 2002 to 2010
(combined from multiple industry sources), I build an empirical many-to-many matching
model in which conflict acts as a cross-match externality when one advertising agency
works for multiples drug advertisers in the same therapeutic category. More specifically,
at the beginning of each year, advertising agencies and drug advertisers are assumed to
observe drug/agency characteristics, match history of the previous year, and the draw of
idiosyncratic shocks for each possible drug-agency pair. They then make matching choices
to maximize their own surplus for the current year. The matching framework accounts
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for the fact that an advertising agency and a drug advertiser will only contract when
both parties find it in their interests to do so, a feature often missed in a more standard
one-sided choice model.
To identify the relative contribution of conflict and characteristics of drugs and
agencies on matching surplus, I rely on the revealed preference approach that compares
the observed matching with its counterfactual deviations. More specifically, I construct
preference inequalities using the model prediction that the stable matching yields higher
total surplus than the alternative matching from a pair-wise deviation. Following J. T. Fox
(2008), I estimate the model using a maximum score estimator. Intuitively, parameters of
the surplus function are identified by the relative frequency of characteristics observed in
equilibrium and in its deviations. In particular, the e ect of conflict on surplus is identified
when a deviation from equilibrium changes the amount of conflict in the market relative
to other characteristics of the match.
There are two main advantages to using the semi-parametric maximum score in
this setting. First, maximum score does not require me to solve the matching model
explicitly and write down the probability of equilibrium allocation. This reduces the
computation burden, especially when the number of participants is large and equilibrium
is slow to compute. Second, the maximum score estimator does not require specifying the
error distribution, so it avoids error misspecification in choice models that may lead to
inconsistent estimators (Hausman et al., 1998).13
13Also, normal error assumptions may be problematic in the vertical contract setting. Vertical relation-
ships are observed to be persistent but can dissolve without sharp changes on observables. One possibility
is that the relationship dissolves as a result of experiencing a rare but large negative shock. This sug-
gests that the error distribution may be asymmetric with a long left tail. In such cases, maximum score
estimation is preferred to parametric error assumptions. For the counterfactual exercise, I assume that
the error follows a mixture of two normal distributions, and calibrate it by matching simulated moments
given the error distribution and the data moments. I find that the distribution is bimodal with one normal
component having a much more negative mean than the positive component, confirming the above big
negative story.
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Using the maximum score estimator, I find that conflict does indeed reduce the
match surplus and is especially costly for a pair of agents who have matched with each
other in the previous period. Also, preserving a previously formed match yields a much
higher joint surplus than forming matches with new partners. Moreover, conflict crowds
out matches whose returns are positive but too low to o set the conflict cost. In a
counterfactual, I find that 14% of all matches that would have formed in a non-conflict
environment are unable to form when conflict is present. Among them, 95% are matches
with new partners. In another counterfactual, I simulate the e ect of a hypothetical
merger between two large advertising holding companies, Omnicom and Publicis.14 With
a combined 32% market share in the US,15 Omnicom and Publicis proposed to merge
in August 2013 but canceled the deal ten months later for various reasons. With the
hypothetical merger, I find that the number of matches with new partners is reduced by
7%; most previously formed matches survive conflict but lose 6.8% of the surplus due to
the increased amount of client conflict in equilibrium.
This chapter is also closely related to the empirical matching literature that has
recently advanced tools for estimating matching models (J. T. Fox (2008); J. T. Fox
(2010); Agarwal (2012)). This line of work deals with the endogeneity that arises from
capacity constraint that each agent’s choice set is endogenous and unobserved. These
models and empirical methods mainly use the sorting pattern of agents who are matched
to identify matching preferences. However, the canonical matching models do not consider
14Mergers of service providers raise particular interest in previous studies of conflict since mergers directly
change the relationship structure. Mergers increase the probability of conflict by reducing the number of
service provider choices, and in some cases, by directly bringing conflicting clients to the same agency.
The advertising agency industry is also of antitrust policy interest since the industry has been gradually
consolidating since the merger waves in the mid 1980s.
15The estimates of total U.S. agency revenue come from Advertising Age, which collects data from
the 1,000 biggest agencies (http://adage.com/article/news/publicis-omnicom-group-facts/243346/). Un-
til 2012, the four biggest agency holding companies in the US ranked by revenue captured 60% of the
advertising service market share.
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other types of externalities arising from client choices, such as conflict. One exception is
Uetake & Watanabe (2012) that studies bank merger as a matching decision and allows
post-match market competition as a source of negative externality. I provide an application
of the matching model that incorporates conflicts.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In the next section, I describe
market of the advertising agencies for pharmaceutical advertisers and explain the dataset
I construct for this study. I then summarize the data and use descriptive regressions to
show matching patterns in this market. In sections 3 and 4, I discuss identification and
estimation of the model and explain the estimated structural parameters. In section 5, I
conduct two sets of counterfactual exercises to analyze the e ect of conflict and the e ect
of advertising agency mergers on the allocation of matches. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Market Description and Data
2.2.1 Agency Market for Pharmaceutical Advertisers
Pharmaceutical companies spend heavily on marketing. Marketing expenditures
on pharmaceuticals amount to $26-36 billion annually, representing 9-12% of the total
drug sales between 2002 and 2010 (Kornfield et al., 2013). Among other promotional ac-
tivities, advertising agencies participate in direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising, which
accounts for 12-15% of their marketing spending. Advertising agencies also collaborate
with pharmaceutical companies on promotional activities aimed at providers (e.g., jour-
nals, meetings and conference), which account for another 27-32% of the total marketing
spending, excluding face-to-face sales representative detailing. As a result, around $10-
16 billion of pharmaceutical advertising spending is billed through advertising agencies
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annually.
Two features of the matching between drug advertisers and advertising agencies
facilitate the study of conflict. First, product market competitors can be defined precisely.
I define that clients are competitors if they seek advertising agencies to advertise for
the same treatment indication (e.g. high cholesterol). The second feature is that drugs
manufactured within the same company usually have independent marketing teams. This
practice is also confirmed in the data. The advertising agencies hired by di erent drugs
manufactured by the same pharmaceutical firm are not clustered. For example, in 2009,
AstraZeneca has 22 drugs hiring advertising agencies, and the drugs hired 13 unique
agencies; Sanofi-Aventis has 39 drugs hiring 17 unique agencies; and Pfizer has 70 drugs
hiring 32 unique agencies. This practice allows me to model each drug (advertiser) as the
decision maker without worrying about the complementarity in the matching decision for
di erent drugs within the same manufacturer.
In terms of commissions paid by drug advertisers to advertising agencies, I assume
in the model that the commissions are determined endogenously by the bargaining rules
between drugs and advertising agencies. In earlier years, the advertising industry’s fee
model compensated advertising agencies with 15% of the total billing, but since the late
1990s, the advertising agency fee model has gradually increased the proportion of incentive
pay in the total amount of fee. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the commission is
not a fixed percentage of the billing.16
2.2.2 Data Sources
I collect data on (1) matches between drug advertisers and advertising agencies,
16In 2003, advertising agencies’ total revenue represented approximately 13% of the capitalized billings
from clients (Horsky, 2006).
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(2) drug advertisers and advertising agencies characteristics, and (3) the organizational
structure of advertising agencies between 2002 and 2010.
I compile data on matches from advertising agency surveys conducted independently
by two industry magazines, Pharmalive and Medical Marketing and Media, and one data
vendor, Advertising Redbooks. To my knowledge, Pharmalive and Medical Marketing and
Media are novel sources of data used for researching relationships between drug advertisers
and advertising agencies. Each conducts annual surveys on US advertising agencies with
a major client base in healthcare.17 Advertising Redbooks (also known as the Standard
Directory of Advertising Agencies) is a comprehensive data source on advertising agency
characteristics and clients and has been used previously in research on advertising agencies
(Horsky (2006); Rogan (2013)). The Redbooks data are used to complement the list of
non-healthcare advertising agencies that form matches with drug advertisers.18 Data on
matches contain information on names of drugs and agencies that have a contract at a
given year, the year the match was first established, and the specific treatment indication
(e.g. High Cholesterol, Crohn’s Disease) of the drug advertised.19
Conflict is defined as the situation in which advertisers for drugs of the same treat-
ment class hire the same advertising agency in the same year. To define treatment
class, I obtain class information from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
17To ensure that the list of agencies working for pharmaceutical companies is comprehensive, I compare
the agency data separately collected by the two industry magazines and find that their coverage overlaps
and includes a similar list of 100 healthcare agencies.
18Although Advertising Redbooks is a standard data set for studying client-agency relationships, the
documentation for matches between drug and advertising agencies is much less complete compared with
data sourced from the industry magazine. Redbooks usually lacks information on product name (e.g., Lip-
itor) and only records the advertiser’s name (e.g., Pfizer). It misses many healthcare specialized agencies,
and it does not include information on when the account was first established.
19One caveat of the match data published by the above sources is that it lacks detailed documentation
of the types of advertising services engaged for each drug-agency pair. Most of the services are marketing
project assignments aimed at reaching consumers and healthcare professionals. In these instances, conflict
is a concern. But there are also accounts for which conflict is not a major consideration when forming
matches, such as media-buying agencies who pools clients’ accounts together in order to negotiate better
media prices. For this reason, I exclude media-buying agencies.
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and Drugs.com, both of which use the coding system provided by Cerner Multum.20 For
any drug advertised for multiple indications, I only keep the major indication.21
In addition to treatment class, I collect information on drug approval date from
the FDA Orange Book and DTC advertising expenditures from the Kantar Media. I also
construct a US blockbuster drug indictor with a dummy set equal to one if the drug was
ranked in the top 200 in annual US sales, based on yearly information from IMS Health
by way of Drugs.com.
An important component in the data construction is deciding at what agency or-
ganization level the clients’ concerns about conflict are relevant (i.e., whether product
competitors only avoid contracting with the same advertising agency, or if they also avoid
contracting with agencies that are associated via a parent holding company). This consid-
eration is especially relevant in the advertising industry since many advertising agencies
exist in a tree-like organizational structure in which advertising agencies are a liated
with one giant parent holding company (e.g., Publicis and Omnicom), and the agencies
themselves have branch o ces in di erent locations. The e ect of conflict may be under-
estimated if conflict is defined at the holding company level when clients, in fact, only
care about conflict within an agency. Conversely, the conflict e ect may be overestimated
if conflict is defined at the agency branch level. In principle, the conflict concern de-
pends on how closely di erent units within the holding company are related in terms of
communicating and decision-making.
I choose to define conflict at the level of the brand name agency, which is one
level below the advertising holding company. The rationale is that brands within the
20I do not use drug indication provided by Pharmalive. Although they are available, they are usually
narrow and the codings of disease names are not comparable across drugs.
21Drug characteristics are collected at the drug level rather than at the drug-treatment level: I collect the
FDA drug approval date for the main treatment indications, but not for the minor treatment indications,
so I drop matches indicating advertising for minor indications.
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same holding company run their own websites, on which they make account-winning and
award-winning announcements under their own brand names. Industry news sources often
quote agencies using their brand names, and agencies within the same holding company
sometimes compete for the same client.22
As an example of the construction, I treat Area23, DraftFCB, McCann, and ICC
Lowe as unique advertising agencies even though they are all directly a liated with the
holding company Interpublic. But I do not treat branch o ces under the same brand name
as independent agencies. So I treat ICC Lowe Pace, ICC Lowe Thermal, and ICC Lowe
Trio as the same agency, ICC Lowe. I determine organizational structures and a liations
using the Corporate A liation data of Thomson Reuters, bundled with Redbooks.
Lastly, to identify organizational change, I collect merger information on all advertis-
ing agencies using the advertising agency SCI code 7311 and the data sources Bloomberg,
CapitalIQ, and SDC Platinum from 2001 to 2011.
2.2.3 Sample Construction
I treat each treatment class in a given year as an independent matching market
since advertising agency contracts are reviewed and renewed annually. I construct data
on prescription drugs and agencies, their characteristics, and their matching statuses each
year between 2002 and 2010.
More specifically, I first determine the set of drug advertisers that potentially seek
matches in a given year and treatment class. In theory, any prescription drug advertiser
may conduct marketing activities and consider hiring an advertising agency for assistance.
But since a complete directory of all drugs currently marketed for each treatment class
22The data sources on drug-agency relationships are also most comprehensive at the brand level as
defined above.
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is not available, I compile the list of likely-to-match drugs using two criteria: a drug
is included if it has ever appeared in the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)’s
Prescribed Medicines File between 2002 and 2010, or if it has appeared in the DTC
advertising data between 1996 and 2011.23 This twofold inclusion criteria allows me to
capture drugs that are either commonly prescribed by doctors or explicitly advertised to
consumers. Drugs missing from my sample tend to be those that treat rare diseases. In
that case, the entire treatment class is not included in my sample. There are also drugs
with small and niche consumer bases that are captured by neither MEPS nor DTCA data.
If such drugs also hire advertising agencies, I assume that they are not good substitutes
for mass market drugs in their classes and hence do not impose conflict concerns.
To be conservative, I assume drugs may start looking for advertising agencies 5 years
before surplus market approval. In the data, I observe that about 10% of the matches
were formed by drugs before they get the FDA approval.24 Majority of them have started
hiring agencies up to 5 years before market approval.25
To determine the set of agencies that potentially serve a treatment class, I include
all agencies that have ever done advertising work for any drug in the treatment class.
Agencies that are newly formed during the sample period are assumed to have started
serving the treatment class from the first year of their establishment. I assume that an
agency has exited the market when it stops being observed in any data set that I use to
compile matching and agency information in a given year.
23MEPS is a nationally representative survey of the U.S. civilian non-institutionalized population con-
ducted by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and covers drugs prescribed to the
general US population.
24Many pharmaceutical companies start to inform medical professionals about the existence of a promis-
ing new drug when it is in the last phase of clinical trials, so we observes in the data that drugs starts to
hire agencies before it gets the FDA approval.
25During the period between 2002 and 2010, there were only 20 matches formed more than 5 years before
the drug was approved.
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2.2.4 Market Descriptive Statistics
There are an average of 627 unique prescription drugs in 152 treatment classes to be
matched in each year between 2002 and 2010. The mean number of drugs in a treatment
class market is 4, with a maximum of 28. Among the 1,214 class-years in the data, 46%
of the treatment classes have only one drug in a given year and do not have any potential
conflict concerns.26 As I mention in the data construction, I treat each agency brand
as a unique agency. There are 149 unique advertising agency brands in the sample, and
each agency can work in multiple markets, generating a total of 1,525 unique agency-class
combinations in the sample. The mean number of agencies in a treatment class market is
8, with a maximum of 38.
Table 1 summarizes the size of each class-year, the number of matches formed, and
the number of conflicts. On average, a class-year contains 4-5 drugs and 8 agencies. In
a typical class-year, 68% of the drugs and 46% of the agencies find at least one match in
the market, which results in around 4-5 matches per class per year. The median size of
the market is small with 2 drugs and 5 agencies. But for the 300 classes that form the
top quartile in terms of market size, each class has more than 6 drugs and 11 agencies.
Drugs can match with more than one agency in a market. Restricting the sample to only
those drugs that obtain at least one match, the mean number of advertising agencies a
drug hires is 1.6. Of all the drugs seeking matches, 59% hire a single agency in a year,
25% hire two agencies, and 15% hire three or more agencies.
Agencies may also match with more than one drug in a market, which results in
a client conflict. In a given market, 7% of agencies are involved in a conflict (roughly
26Although these drugs do not help identify conflict, they help to identify preferences of drugs and
agencies.
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one agency in each class), and each conflict contains 2 drug advertisers, on average. An
average of 2.5 matches, or 25% of all matches, are caught in conflict in a market. In the
following descriptive regressions, I will show which drugs and agencies are more likely to
be matched and to be caught in conflict.
In addition to the static market statistics, Table 2 shows a high degree of state
dependence among matches, which is commonly observed in vertical relationships. Among
nearly 700 matches formed each year, around 73% of the drug-agency pairs will match
with each other again in the next year. It should also be noted that the probability of
match dissolution is similar regardless of how many years the relationship has been formed
before. The probability of match dissolution appears independent of the relationship
duration, remaining at a constant rate of 23 to 25 percent. This suggests that the value
of preserving previous matches versus starting new matches is similar regardless of how
many years the relationship has formed. Meanwhile, new drug-agency pairs form around
28% of all matches formed in a given year.
I use descriptive regressions to examine which drugs and agency characteristics are
associated with a higher probability of forming matches. We expect that drugs have
more incentives to hire agencies when they have a large marketing budget and when they
conduct the types of promotional activities that they lack the specialty and resources
to market on their own. For example, drugs often delegate DTC advertising, consumer
and professional educational programs, and conference organization tasks to advertising
agencies. And given that an advertising agency’s capacity in dealing with each client
is limited, we will also expect that a drug advertiser with a bigger marketing budget is
also more likely to find it profitable to hire more than one agency. The lower panel of
Table 3 presents simple comparisons by drug characteristics that do and do not hire any
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advertising agencies in a class-year and Table 4 shows the results of linear probability
regressions of a drug’s agency hiring decision. Both tables confirm the expectations. A
drug that spends more on DTC advertising, in particular DTC advertising on TV, and a
drug approved by the FDA and enjoying market exclusivity27 is more likely to hire one or
more advertising agencies. The result is similar if I compare across drugs in column (1),
or within drugs in column (2) of Table 4.
I also examine whether drug advertisers with a larger marketing budget hire more
agencies. (See columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.) Conditional on having any match in a
given market, I regress the dummy variable of a drug having multiple matches on drug
characteristics. Both regressions, with and without drug fixed e ects, show that drugs
with higher levels of DTC advertising and drugs that are between approval and patent
expiration are more likely to hire multiple agencies.
The summary statistics in the upper panel of Table 3 and linear probability regres-
sions of Table 5 compare the characteristics of advertising agencies that are hired or not
hired in a market. The di erences in characteristics are very small, and regression results
are weak with a small R2 of 0.01 if I do not control for agency fixed e ects. The signs of
the di erences are still as expected: an advertising agency with a bigger size in terms of
total billing and total number of employees is more likely to get matches, and more likely
to have conflicting clients. In addition, an agency claiming consumer specialty is less likely
to get a match, and an agency claiming specialty in handling health accounts is more likely
to get a match. This is reasonable because advertising agencies with a consumer focus
usually only deal with a few blockbuster drugs for which they create TV ads, but do not
targets pharmaceutical clients in general.
27Patent expiration data is approximated by 12 years as documented in the literature. The publicly
accessible FDA Orange Book is incomplete in dating the exclusivity period for each individual drug in my
sample.
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In tracing the identity of the advertising agencies, I also identified nine merger cases
that a ect 20 advertising agencies in my sample period. Although the number of mergers
is small, the agencies involved in the mergers worked in a wide range of treatment classes,
and a single merger a ects many classes at the same time. During the sample period,
treatment classes that have ever had an advertising agency a ected by the mergers is 127,
or 80% of all classes. Counting the number of class-years that are a ected by an agency
at the year of its merger, 389 are a ected. And if counting all class-years with a merged
agency post its merger event, there are 826 such class-years, or 54% of all class-years in
sample. This gives us enough variations to identify the average merger e ect of matching
surplus.
2.3 Model Estimation and Identification
I use the maximum score estimator proposed by J. T. Fox (2010) to estimate the
matching surplus function by assuming that the observed matches in the data represent
the socially optimal equilibrium. Using pairwise deviation conditions that characterize
the socially optimal allocation and a rank order property, I identify the model by com-
paring the total surplus of observed matches to counterfactual matches following pairwise
deviation.
2.3.1 Maximum Score Estimator
Applying pairwise deviation conditions to the socially optimal allocation, I derive a
system of inequalities that can be used to estimate the surplus function without requiring
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1{S(i, j|µek, ◊) ≠ S(iÕ, jÕ|µ̃k, ◊) Ø 0} (4)
where k denotes each independent matching market, K is the total number of markets, D̃k
is the set of pairwise deviation matchings from allocation µek , and µek is the equilibrium
matching in market k. The objective function of the estimator is to find a parameter
vector ◊̂ to maximize the number of times that the observed equilibrium yields greater
surplus than the pairwise deviated allocations based on deterministic characteristics of the
model.
Given that agents in the markets behave according to the set of random preference
shocks they draw and that the shocks are unobserved by the econometrician, surplus
inequalities constructed based on deterministic characteristics are not guaranteed to hold.
In order to apply the maximum score estimator, J. T. Fox (2010) proves a rank-order
property that is key to model identification. The rank-order property states that the
match allocation that yields higher surplus based on observables is more likely to be
observed in the data, under the condition that the errors are i.i.d. distributed for each
match. Denote A as the realization of matching allocation, W as the observable, S as the
surplus function, and G as the stochastic structure of the model. The probability of the
allocation A given observables W is





The rank order property states that
Pr(A1|W ; S, G) > Pr(A2|W ; S, G)







With the rank order property, the estimator is constructed to punish the wrong prediction
of inequalities based on the deterministic part of the surplus. The crucial assumption for
identification using maximum score is that ‘ij = ‘iij + ‘
j
ij is i.i.d. across all matches.
Specifically, heteroskedastic errors based on match characteristics are not allowed.
Table 7 listed the full set of pairwise deviation conditions used. In general, the
deviations are of three types. The first involves replacing one partner in the current
match with another opponent. This type of deviation does not change the total number
of matches in a market. The second type involves adding a new match, and the third type
involves dissolving a current match. This list exhausts all possible pairwise deviations. In
estimation, I use all inequalities derived from these deviations.
My model setup, combined with the ability to observe all agents in the market,
allows me to use a larger set of inequalities than that used in J. T. Fox (2010). These
inequalities also help me to identify the impact of agent-specific characteristics. One major
di erence in my model setup from classic matching models is that I assume away capacity
constraints for drugs, hence removing competition among advertising agencies contracted
by drug advertisers. This assumption allows a drug marketing team’s decision to add or
drop a match to be independent of its decisions about other matches. Hence, inequalities
based on unilateral deviation of a drug does not concern transfers. Such inequalities
36
cannot be constructed by the model in J. T. Fox (2010) or in matching models with
capacity constraints since a one-sided deviation involves an agent exceeding its quota of
matches. To construct such a deviation, one needs to know the transfer paid to one agent
in order to induce it to replace a partner.
There are two main advantages to using maximum score estimation in my setting.
First, the maximum score estimator is free from error distribution assumptions, so it avoids
the concern that misspecified error in choice models could lead to inconsistent estimators
(Hausman et al., 1998). It is particularly useful in analyzing vertical relationships since
the errors may be asymmetric. Given that vertical relationships are observed to be persis-
tent, the adverse shock must be large to dissolve the relationship without sharp changes on
observables. This suggests that an error may be associated with large downside risk dis-
proportional to upside shocks in size. Without strong ex-ante information about the error
distribution, maximum score estimation is preferred to making parametric error assump-
tions. I calibrate the error distribution assuming a mixture of two normal distributions,
and I find that the distribution is bimodal, with one normal distribution having a much
more negative mean than the positive mean of the other normal distribution. Second,
maximum score estimation does not require solving the matching model fully. When the
number of participants in the markets is large, the maximum score estimator reduces the
computation burden relative to parametric models.
The estimation approach of using preference inequalities is known to lack point iden-
tification if there is not a match-specific densely distributed continuous variable. Although
I include agency size as a continuous variable in the model, I do not have a comparable
densely distributed variable for drugs, so I can only set-identify the parameters. In order
to conduct inference, I estimate confidence regions for set-identified parameters following
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Shaikh (2006) and the estimation manual of Santiago & Fox (2008).
2.3.2 Model Specification
Descriptive regressions in section 2 show that some drug and agency characteristics
are important for predicting matches, that past matching relationships matter, and that
conflict may a ect the match surplus. Assuming linearity in parameters, I specify the
matching surplus function of an advertiser-agency pair as
Sij = Xi– + Zj— + XiZj“ + ⁄Lij ≠ 1(|µj | Ø 2) ◊ Ÿc ≠ Ÿf + ‘ij
where Xi is a vector of drug characteristics, including drug life-cycle, an indicator for DTC
advertising and DTC TV advertising, and an indicator if the drug was a top-200 selling
prescription drug in the US in the previous year. I use an indicator of whether a drug
does direct-to-consumer advertising for the current period because I assume that the drug
advertiser has decided if it will do any DTC advertising before forming matches.28 Zj
contains characteristics of the agency, including number of employees, total billing, age,
and claimed specialty in the past year. I use agency information for the previous year
since this is the information drug advertisers have when making matching decisions. Also,
I include the interaction between drug and agency characteristics to determine whether
synergy is created when drugs and agencies of specific characteristics match together.
Zj also contains information on agency mergers. Since I do not explicitly model
the endogenous merger decision, I add a dummy to control the unobserved di erences
28One can argue that drug’s observed current year advertising spending depends on if the drug is matched
to an agency, and is endogenous. I also tried in the reduced form to include the previous year’s advertising
spending, assuming that past spendings predicts the amount the drug plans to spend in the current year.
The results are similar.
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of merging agencies in contributing to the match surplus. I add one dummy variable
for an advertising agency that has ever had a merger during the sample period, and
another dummy variable for an advertising agency during periods after its merger. Adding
merger dummies to capture the unobserved synergy also prevents me from over-stating
the adverse e ects of mergers in the counterfactual analysis. Although mergers reduce
matching opportunities, synergy makes each matching opportunity more attractive and
hence could lead to more matches and matches with higher surplus. Endogeneity of merger
decisions could lead to an over-estimation of merger synergy since only advertising agencies
that stand to gain decide to merge. Since I argue that mergers reduce total surplus by
reducing matching opportunities, if endogeneity of mergers is a concern, mergers’ adverse
e ects on total surplus will only be understated in the counterfactual analysis.
From the persistence of contract, it is expected that preserving a match formed by
partners matched in t ≠ 1 is much more valuable than a match formed by new partners
in period t, so a dummy Lij is added that is equal to 1 if Matchij,t≠1 = 1. In some
specifications, I inspect whether the value of past matches di ers for matches with di erent
advertising agency and drug characteristics by interacting Lij with Xi and Zj .
Matching cost is denoted as Ÿf and is common across matches. Conflict cost is
denoted as Ÿc. Given that previously formed matches play an important role in predicting
matches, I also interact Lij with conflict to examine whether it is more or less costly for
previously formed matches to be caught in conflict compared to newly formed matches.
2.3.3 Identification
To restate the key identifying assumption, I assume that errors are drawn inde-
pendently from the same distribution. This assumes away heteroskedastic error, and the
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concern that there may be unobservables correlated with the controls.29 In addition, as-
sumptions made on the matching model are maintained in the estimation for identification.
The maximum score estimator applies the idea of revealed preference: the match
allocation we observe in the market is more likely to yield higher aggregate surplus than
alternative allocations. This suggests that the characteristics more often observed in the
matches are likely have a positive impact on the match surplus. By checking each type
of deviation from the observed equilibrium, the estimator compares the relative e ects of
the sets of characteristics a ected by the deviation. In the following section, I explain
the pairwise deviations derived from the surplus optimization conditions and show how
di erent sets of deviations help identify di erent parameters of the model.
Comparisons of surpluses between observed allocation and deviation should be writ-
ten in expectation. For convenience of illustrating which coe cients are identified from
di erent sets of deviations, I will only focus on the deterministic part of the surplus func-
tion.
The cost of conflict is identified when a deviation causes the number of matches
formed by an advertising agency to change. For example, consider the deviation in which a
drug i replaces one of its hired advertising agencies j œ µ(i) with another agency jÕ ”œ µ(i),
causing a change in the amount of conflict. The change in total surplus is illustrated in
the following formula,
(Zj ≠ ZjÕ)— + Xi(Zj ≠ ZjÕ)“ + ⁄ Li +  ConflictCost Ø 0
29One advantage of using inequalities that only involve the comparison between di erent matching
opportunities is that this allows for the presence of market level unobservables that might be correlated
with the controls. Depending on the set of inequalities used, we can even allow agent-specific unobservables
when they are di erenced away with the construction of inequalities. However, in order to recover all
parameters for the counterfactual exercise, I need to use inequalities that compare opportunities of being
matched with unmatched, and hence need to make a strong exogenous assumption.
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0 if Nj = 1, NjÕ = 0 or Nj Ø 2, NjÕ Ø 2
Ÿc if Nj = 1, NjÕ Ø 2
2Ÿc if Nj = 1, NjÕ = 1
≠Ÿc if Nj > 2, NjÕ = 0 or Nj = 2, NjÕ Ø 1
≠2Ÿc if Nj = 2, NjÕ = 0.
(6)
In this type of deviation, the relative value (cost) of agency characteristics, agency and
drug synergy, matches formed in the past, and conflict is identified. The above compar-
ison between equilibrium and its deviation illustrates the properties associated with the
identification from preference inequalities.
First, because of the sign of the conflict cost and the sign of the inequality, I must
identify the upper and lower bounds of the conflict cost using di erent inequalities. For
example, assume that the conflict is indeed costly and has a negative impact on surplus. I
identify the lower bound of the magnitude of the conflict cost when the amount of conflict
increases in the deviation, and I identify the upper bound of the absolute value of conflict
cost when the amount of conflict decreases in the deviation. So it is necessary to include
full sets of inequalities to identify both bounds.
Second, note that the one-sided deviation is necessary to identify conflict cost. If
deviation involves two pairs of matches switching partners with each other (as in J. T. Fox
(2008)), it causes no change in the number of drug advertisers an advertising agency works
for and does not help identify conflict.
Third, it becomes clear in the inequality that the model can only be identified up to
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scale. Mathematically, scaling all coe cients up or down does not change the probability
of the allocation being observed. Intuitively, I can only measure the relative e ect of the
impact of di erent characteristics on the match surplus. In the estimation, I choose to
normalize coe cients by ||◊|| = 1.
The above deviation also hints at which coe cients are not identified if I focus
only on a subset of the inequalities. Switching the advertising agencies a drug hires only
involves changes in agency characteristics, and the drug’s own characteristics are not
identified since they are di erenced away in the inequalities. Intuitively, the impact of
drug characteristics on surplus can only be identified when deviation involves replacing a
drug. I am also unable to identify the cost of matching since there is no change in the
total number of matches formed. I can only identify the cost of matching by adding or
dropping matches from the equilibrium.
The absolute “location” of the surplus function is not identified, but it is relative
to the outside option of not forming a match. To be precise, when I discuss the benefits
and costs of forming matches, these are actually the benefits and costs of forming matches
relative to the outside option. For example, since the “cost” per match Ÿf is the constant
term for the surplus function, it represents the net cost (benefit) of forming a match
relative to the outside option for the baseline match.30 As for the coe cients on other
characteristics involved in a match, I interpret them as the e ect of each characteristic
on the net surplus relative to the outside option of a match. In the case of a positive
coe cient, for example, the model cannot separately identify whether the e ect comes
from increasing the relative value of a match or decreasing the relative cost of a match.
30In the estimation, continuous variables are centered at their sample mean.
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2.4 The Impact of Conflict on Surplus
In this section, I first present suggestive evidence of the existence of conflict us-
ing reduced form regressions and then present the conflict parameters estimated in the
structural model.
2.4.1 Descriptive Evidence on Conflict
I run descriptive regressions to look for evidence that matches are less likely to form
when two or more drug advertisers in the same class contract with the same agency.
Ideally, I can condition on each drug’s probability of forming a match and examine
whether one drug’s decision to match with an agency is a ected by its competitor’s prob-
ability of matching with the same agency. However, intention to match is not observed;
only matches formed in equilibrium are observed. Replacing the intention to match with
observed matches obviously causes endogeneity. In the same spirit but using a slightly
revised regression, I define that a match with an agency causes “potential conflict” when
the agency was observed to match with the drug’s competitor in the previous period.
When errors are not temporally correlated, matches in the past period are uncorrelated
with error in the current period. Also, if an agency matched with a drug in the previous
period, about 73% chance this match will form again, so the potential conflict defined in
the past period is likely to be a good predictor of potential conflict in the present.
In the regression, I pool all possible matching opportunities between drugs and
agencies in each class-year and use the linear probability model to describe which charac-
teristics are associated with a higher probability of matches. Besides “potential conflict,” I
include the same set of controls as in the structural specification, including characteristics
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of drugs and agencies and past match relationships. The evidence in Table 8 is robust to
adding heterogeneous e ects of previously formed matches.
Table 8 also shows heterogeneous impacts of previously formed matches on current
matching choices. Specifically, results show that matches with certain drug and agency
characteristics are associated with a higher probability of matching again the next period,
the implications of which fit both a story of sunk cost and one of value created in the
previously formed relationship. On the one hand, matches with drug advertisers utilizing
DTC and DTC TV spending are more likely to continue relationships with agencies, which
can be explained by the high sunk cost association with TV ad production.31 On the other
hand, matches with agencies with more employees are more likely to continue into the next
year, which is consistent with a value creation story in which advertising agencies with
larger teams may be more likely to provide a diverse and more e ective service in the long
term than the more specialized smaller agencies.
2.4.2 Maximum Score Estimates of Conflict
The baseline specification of surplus function includes drug and agency character-
istics, merger indicators for agencies, and an indicator for previously formed matches. It
also allows conflict cost to vary between previously formed matches and new matches.
Given that the estimators are identified up to scale, I choose to normalize coe cients by
restricting the sum of coe cients squared to be one, or ||◊|| = 1, and exclude the coe cient
for the indicator for the previously formed matches given the normalization restriction.
31The regression also suggests that drugs that haven’t yet received FDA approval are more likely to
continue their contracts. This may be driven by the censoring of the number of years drugs start looking
for agencies before approval. Drugs on average will contract with an agency for 4 years (with match
dissolution rate at about 27%), but the majority (90%) of observed matches are formed at less than or
equal to 3 years before approval.
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Maximum score estimates for the baseline specification are shown in specification (1) of
Table 9.
The cost of conflict is relative to the value of the matches. The value of preserving
a previously formed match relative to the cost of forming a match with a new partner
is the most important contributor to the match surplus. Comparing the midpoint of
the estimates, the cost of conflict to a previously formed match relationship is equal to
roughly 25% the value of such a relationship. Conflict is also costly in matches with new
partners, but the magnitude is much smaller, at only 2% of the cost associated with the
new relationship. Although the cost of conflict is large only for previously formed matches,
these matches represent 72% of all matches. Conflict a ecting these matches also plays
an important role in determining the overall matching allocation as I will show in the
counterfactual exercise.
It is not surprising that conflict is much more costly for previously formed rela-
tionships. One reason is that an advertising agency’s knowledge about a drug advertiser
grows quickly in the first year of the relationship, so the agency puts a greater amount
of confidential information at risk when it signs with the established client’s competitor.
Drugs will be more worried about information leakage after the initial year of a contract
than when the match was first formed. The other reason is explained in Rogan (2013).
She finds that conflicts result in higher probabilities of client switching when the relation-
ships have existed for a longer time because the advertiser’s trust is betrayed when the
advertising agency he previously worked with takes on his product market competitor.
Given the important role of previously formed matches in a ecting current matches,
I discuss two main explanations - sunk cost and match-specific unobservables - in the
matching market between drug advertisers and advertising agencies. The persistence of
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contracts may result from the fixed cost invested in the initiation of a relationship, for
example, the cost of learning about the product, becoming familiar with advertising reg-
ulations specific to the drug, and conducting consumer research. In other words, these
investments also become relationship-specific assets accumulated in the previous contrac-
tual period (Riordan & Williamson, 1985). Another interpretation is that this captures
the unobserved time-invariant match-specific heterogeneity specific to the pair. If this is
the case, we should expect that the pair that matched in any previous period but not
in the past period would have a higher probability of forming a match again than a pair
that has never contracted before. However, I do not find such evidence in the data. The
probability of a pair that matched in the previous year matching again is 0.77. This
probability is 0.028 for a pair who did not match in the previous year, but matched years
before, and the probability is 0.20 for a pair who has never matched before. This evidence
supports a sunk cost mechanism as the main driver of contract persistence. The sunk
cost explanation may imply dynamic incentives that this study does not directly address,
but I will be careful in interpreting the e ect of conflict on allocation of matches between
previously formed matches and new matches.
Moreover, a merger produces a big synergy e ect that is one-third the size of the
cost of conflict for previously formed matches. In addition, agencies that have ever been
involved in a merger produce a higher surplus in their matches. Merger synergy will make
matching opportunities more desirable, counteracting the matching opportunities it takes
away for drug advertisers, so counterfactual exercises are necessary to evaluate the merger
e ect. Other drug and agency characteristics appear to be much less important since the
indicator for past relationship is included, and year-to-year variations of drug and agency
characteristics are small.
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I also run alternative specifications for robustness checks and find that the relative
magnitudes of conflict costs and benefits of the previous matches and common matching
costs are similar across specifications. One specification deserves special note: I investigate
whether there is a capacity constraint for drug advertisers by allowing the matching cost
to change when drugs form additional matches. The result is shown in column (2) of Table
9. There is no evidence that it is more costly for the drug to take on additional matches.
In an unreported table, I also allow conflict cost to vary when the number of drugs in a
conflicting relationship grows. The di erential conflict cost is not significant, suggesting
that it is reasonable to make the constant conflict cost assumption. Because the presence
of previously formed matches has an important e ect on surplus, I try allowing this e ect
to di er by drug and advertising agency characteristics and allowing the e ect to di er by
the duration of the established relationship. In the first model with heterogeneous e ects
of past matches, the coe cients are all insignificant, and the magnitudes of the main
coe cients are unchanged. In the second model of heterogeneity with time, I add dummy
variables to indicate the di erent durations of the established relationship.32 There is no
evidence that a longer relationship is more or less valuable, which is consistent with the
data pattern: match dissolution rates are roughly the same conditional on number of years
observing the relationship.
2.5 Counterfactual
I conduct counterfactual exercises to examine the e ect of conflict on equilibrium
matches given the current market structure, and I then examine the e ect of a change in
market structure when conflict is costly. I will explain how conflict a ects the allocation
32I add dummies for matches that have lasted one, two, three, and four or more years.
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of matches conceptually and then discuss details and results of the counterfactuals.
2.5.1 Conflict Crowds Out Matches
When there is additional cost for an advertising agency to simultaneously serve directly
competing advertisers, any pair of drug and advertising agencies with a positive net return
should form a match, denoted as rij = yij ≠ Ÿf + ‘ij > 0. However, when concern about
conflict exists, it lowers the return of conflicting matches and makes some matches no
longer profitable to form. This crowding out e ect depends on the match return and
number of matches caught in conflict.
A match with a net return lower than the conflict cost it incurs, rij < Ÿc,ij , will
not sustain conflict since it is never socially optimal to add a match whose net surplus is
negative. When two or more matches in this range try to match with the same advertising
agency, only the single match with highest return will form with the agency.
When the net return of the match is greater than its conflict cost rij > Ÿc,ij , two
situations may arise. In the first situation, the match is crowded out when there exists
another match with the agency whose return is higher. Compared with having one match,
adding an additional match not only incurs an extra conflict cost for the added match
but also creates a conflict cost for the existing match. So in order to form, the additional
match must be valuable enough to overcome both its own conflict cost and the externality
it creates for the other match in order to form the match, rij > Ÿc,ij +Ÿc,iÕj . In the second
situation, the match will always form. This happens when the match’s return is high
enough to overcome the conflict cost externality, or that the match is of higher value for
the advertising agency, so it crowds out other matches.
The above mechanisms through which matches are crowded out is interesting since
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they imply that even though conflict cost for new matches may be low, it is still di culty
for new matches to form because, when in conflict with a previously formed match, the
new match must overcome the previously formed match’s conflict cost in addition to its
own conflict cost.
Since estimation does not support conflict cost as an increasing function of the
number of matches in conflict, this negative externality only exists for the first marginal
match added. Conditional on having two matches for an agency, the third match only
adds a conflict cost for itself. This suggests that if the agency already has two matches
in equilibrium with su ciently high net returns to sustain conflict, a new match’s return
only needs to be higher than its own conflict cost for it to form.
2.5.2 Error Calibration
Simulating the market equilibrium requires knowledge of the error distribution. Since the
maximum score estimation strategy does not impose assumptions on the error distribution,
I calibrate the error distribution by matching simulated moments to the data moments
using di erent distribution parameters. I explain the details of the calibration exercise in
this section.
I choose a mixture of normal distributions because the error distribution is likely to
be asymmetric based on the pattern of match formation and dissolution observed in the
data. The previous data description indicates that most matches with partners matched
in the previous year will form again in the current year. The parameter estimates reflect
that preserving previously formed matches yields a much higher surplus than forming new
matches. Without any preference shocks, the magnitude of the surplus gain for previously
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formed matches is so large that no observed characteristics, including conflict, can have
enough impact to dissolve such matches. The data shows, however, that previously formed
matches dissolve one fourth of the time in a given year. This suggests that there must
exist some large unobserved downside shock that dissolves previously formed matches.
Compared to previously formed matches, most matches not formed in the previous year
will not form in a new year, as the cost of forming a match is larges. So there must be some
large positive shocks to match the data pattern that one fourth of all matches formed in a
given year are new matches. Since the mean value for an existing match is much higher in
absolute value than the matching cost, I expect the shocks to have a longer left tail than
right tail.
Besides the ratio of match formation and dissolution that helps to identify the error
distribution, the amount of conflict in which previously formed matches and new matches
are involved in also provides information on error distribution. Imagine the case in which
the error distribution is a mixture of two normal distributions, each with mean fixed. The
variances of the two normal components determine the distribution of surplus conditional
on deterministic characteristics of the matches. The distribution of the match surplus, in
turn, determines how many new matches with relatively low value will be crowded out
because of conflict, and how many can sustain a relationship with conflict. At the same
time, it determines how many previously formed matches crowd out new matches and
remain matched without conflict and how many are matched while in conflict with new or
previously formed matches. Hence I add two more moments in calibration, the percentage
of previously formed matches, and the percentage of new matches involved in a conflicting
relationship, to identify the variance of the two distribution components.
To summarize, I use four moments to identify four parameters governing the mixture
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of two normal distributions. The moments are, in each period, the percentage of previously
formed matches that form again, the percentage of new matches among the currently
formed matches, the percentage of previously formed matches caught in conflict, and
the percentage of new matches caught in conflict. The lower panel of Table 11 shows
the distribution of errors. The two normal components have one positive mean and one
negative mean, and the negative mean much greater in absolute value than the positive
mean. Since the error is centered at zero, the component with the negative mean has
a much lower weight. It confirms the intuition that relationships can have very large
downside shocks, but with some relatively small probability of occurring.
2.5.3 The Impact of Conflict on Market Equilibrium
In the first counterfactual, I compare the the match allocation with conflict cost as es-
timated with the match allocation that would arise if I assume the conflict cost is zero.
Both are based on market observables and 500 paths of match-specific error draws. The
results are shown in Table 12.
Taking the scenario without conflict cost as the baseline, the first result of note
in Table 12 is that conflict crowds out 14% of matches that would have formed without
conflict. Among 876 matches crowded by conflict, 849 are new matches. This is consistent
with my earlier analysis that even though the conflict cost for new matches is small, their
chances of finding matches are the most a ected. As the conceptual analysis illustrates,
two types of matches are crowded out. The first type is a match that has a return lower
than its conflict cost and cannot survive in a conflicting relationship. The second type is a
match that has a high enough return to overcome its own conflict, but cannot compensate
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the negative externality it causes in conflict. The majority (75.5%) of crowded out matches
belong to the second type. This illustrates the importance of taking into account the
negative externality that conflict places on choices.
The crowding out e ect also suggests a distributional e ect on the market equilib-
rium. When conflict reduces the overall surplus for an agency, a socially optimal equi-
librium dictates that only the match that yields the largest surplus can be kept. In the
static framework, this suggests that new drugs or drugs not previously matched will find
it harder to match with agencies. In a dynamic framework, however, matches may be
formed based on the expected future return. That being said, we may still expect a simi-
lar result in a dynamic setting: the drug that is expected to remain a fringe product with
lower market share and small marketing budget will find it harder to match with desirable
advertising agencies.
The high-return matches are less a ected by the conflict. Even in the event of
conflict, they can either crowd out other lower return matches, or stay in the conflicting
relationship if they are willing to accept a lower surplus due to a ected agency performance
or to spare enough resources to ensure that the agency firmly maintains information
confidentiality. For the second type of matches, even though the drug advertiser knows
that forming a conflicting match will lower the productivity of the relationship, it will
still find it more profitable to form the match with conflict than to give up the matching
opportunity. Comparing to the scenario without conflict, the mean surplus of matches in
conflict is reduced by 11.5% due to conflict cost.
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2.5.4 The Impact of Merger on Market Equilibrium
My second counterfactual simulates a market structure change resulting from a success-
ful the merger between Publicis and Omnicom. The two advertising holding companies
proposed to merge in July 2013, but the deal was called o  in May 2014. The proposed
merger would have a ected pharmaceutical clients if Publicis and Omnicom had consol-
idated some of their health agencies. I consider a hypothetical integration of Publicis’
Publicis Healthcare Communications Group(PHCG), and Omnicom’s Cline, Davis and
Mann (CDM). Because my data ends with 2010, I will use observed characteristics in
2010, and previous match relationship status at the end of 2009 to predict matches af-
fected by the merger. At the end of 2009, both PHCG and CDM are sizable agencies
that are available to match in a wide range of markets. PHCG and CDM overlap in 31
treatment classes overall. In 2009, they actively serve for drug advertisers in 15 of these
treatment classes.
Conceptually, a merger has four kinds of e ects, each of which a ects the direction
of surplus changes di erently.
The first e ect is that the synergy created by mergers helps to increase total surplus.
Synergy raises the mean return of all matching opportunities with the merged agencies
This creates a positive return for a greater share of matching opportunity and increase
the surplus of matches that form.
The second e ect runs counter to the first one. Mergers reduce the number of adver-
tising agencies from which a drug marketer can choose and reduce the expected number
of matches in the market. This is similar to the concept of welfare loss when product
variety is reduces in a market with di erentiated goods but di ers in that drugs’ demand
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for advertising agencies is not restricted to one unit. Because of the limited number of
agencies working within a treatment class and the even fewer number of matching oppor-
tunities with a positive return, the model assumes that a drug marketing team always
enjoys variety and would like to match with any agency with which it yields a positive
return. With this assumption, when two agencies in a market consolidate into one, the
expected number of matches is halved.
The third e ect comes from the increasing probability of conflict. I will focus on the
analysis in a single treatment market and explain two cases that raise potential conflicts.
In the first case, a merger involves one agency that did not match with any drug in the
previous period and another agency that matched with one drug in the market. When the
agencies merge, not only does the matching opportunity decrease, but the match between
the merged agency and the single previously matched drug also crowds out new matches
with lower returns. In this case, merger exacerbates the crowding out e ect.
In the second case, the merger involves two agencies that were both previously
matched with one or more drugs in the market. Because of the value of the past rela-
tionship, both drugs brought into the merged agency are very likely to bear the conflict
costs and continue the contracts. Because the negative externality only applies to the first
marginal match that moves an agency from no conflict to some conflict. any other drug
that wishes to match with the merged agency only needs to overcome its own conflict cost.
Hence, in this case, the merger actually weakens the crowding out e ect.
The last e ect is on the previously formed high-return matches that would be
brought to the same agency through merger. Whether the matches dissolve depends
on the synergy and the variance of the downside shock. However, even when the conflict-
ing matches remain in the same agency, the merged agency’s performance is a ected by
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having to deal with the rising number of conflicting clients.
The simulated hypothetical merger combines the above mechanisms, and Table 13
shows the results. Although the value of merger synergy is equal to 25% of the common
matching cost (Table 11), suggesting that mergers significantly improve the matching
opportunity for all matches, the number of matches and total surplus are reduced overall.
The merger a ects both the number and the surplus of equilibrium matches. First, the
total number of matches decreases, and all of the decrease comes from a reduced number
of new matches. Although only four matches are not formed because of the merger, this
represents 10% of the new matches that would form in the absence of the merger. Second,
previously formed matches are 68% more likely to be brought into actual conflict after the
merger. Although none of these matches will dissolve due to the merger, their surplus is
reduced by 6.8%.
PHCG and CDM both have contracts with at least one drug in each of the over-
lapping markets they serve. When the mergers bring these competing drugs into the
same agency, the conflict cost is not large enough to dissolve these high-return matches
and therefore increases the number of actual conflicts in the market. After these existing
matches pay the big initial cost of conflict, additional conflicts only pay their own conflict
cost and hence find it easier to match even when there is conflict. The second panel of
Table 13 shows that the number of crowded out matches is actually reduced after the
merger. Therefore, this merger reduces the number of matches mainly through disrupting




Using a matching model with conflict, I analyze contract decisions between drug advertis-
ers and advertising agencies and examine the market equilibrium e ect of client conflict.
The model shows that it is important to take into account the negative externality gener-
ated from conflict for both the agents that were matched in the previous period and those
that are seeking new partners. Focusing on the outcome of contract allocation, I show
that conflict crowds out a significant amount of contracts with lower returns. The consoli-
dation of advertising agencies reduces the number of equilibrium contracts by eliminating
di erentiated products (agencies). The crowding out e ect through merger may increase
or decrease depending on the contract allocation at the time of the merger.
Conflict raises new angles in merger analysis. Since I analyze a market equilibrium
without pricing ine ciencies, I cannot analyze advertising agencies’ market power beyond
the above discussions. But the implication for merger analysis of the existence of conflict
is clear and is easily extended to a wide range of professional service markets. Conflict
reduces the alternatives for clients, and when service agencies merge, it further reduces
substitution among service agencies. This limitation to the substitution pattern can be
especially acute in professional service industries since the number of service agencies
working for one type of client is usually limited due to the client’s demand for expertise.
And because experience is highly valued in service agencies, the entry barrier in these
markets is also considerable. This suggests that a more thorough analysis is necessary to
take into account conflict, market segmentation due to the expertise, and entry barriers
when conducting merger analysis.
This study bears several limitations due to data constraints. First, the assumption
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that the capacity constraint does not bind for drug advertisers is not directly testable
but is necessary because I need a characterization of the equilibrium using only observed
match allocations. Even with stability, conflict is not identified in canonical matching
models that require knowledge of both transfer and matching allocation in characteriz-
ing the equilibrium. Second, due to the importance of sunk cost and the crowding out
e ect created by conflict, it would be interesting to investigate dynamic incentives and
pricing powers in dynamic games. Without transfer data, however, this work cannot be
undertaken empirically, but theoretical analysis would be the first step toward drawing a
complete picture in a dynamic framework. Third, the study takes the market structure
as given and examines the e ect of conflict on equilibrium matches due to the limited
time span of the observed data. With historical data, the exact entry date of advertising
agencies into each therapeutic market may be observed. Endogenizing entry and merger
decision in the model and analyzing the impact of conflict on market structure will be
interesting directions for future research.
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2.7 Tables
Table 1: Statistics on Matching Markets
Mean StdDev 25th Median 75th N
Summary of # of Drug and Agency per Class-year1
# of Drugs 4.4 11.1 1 2 6 1,214
# Drugs Matched 2.8 3.3 1 1 4 1,214
% of Drugs Matched 68% 36% 50% 76% 100% 1,214
# of Agencies 7.8 7.4 2 5 11 1,214
# of Agencies Matched 3.7 4.1 1 2 5 1,214
% of Agencies Matched 46% 29% 50% 28% 60% 1,214
Summary of # of Matches per Class-year
# of Matches 4.5 5.6 1 2 6 1,214
# of Matches per Drug 1.1 1.1 0 1 2 5,012
# of Matches per Matched Drug 1.6 0.9 1 1 2 3,703
# of Matches per Agency 0.6 0.7 0 0 1 9,470
# of Matches per Matched Agency 1 0.6 1 1 1 4,995
Overview of Amount of Conflicts per Class-year2
# of Class-year with Conflicts 322
# of Matches in Conflicts 2.5 3.9 0 2 4 657
% Matches in Conflicts 23% 27% 0 13% 43% 657
# of Drugs in Conflicts 2.1 3.0 0 0 3 657
% of Drugs in Conflicts 23% 28% 0% 0% 40% 657
# of Agencies in Conflicts 1.1 1.5 0 0 2 657
% of Agencies in Conflicts 7% 11% 0% 0% 12.5% 657
# Drugs per Conflict Relationship3 2.3 0.5 2 2 2.5 657
1 There are 158 unique treatment classes, and there are a total of 1,214 class-year (markets) in our analysis
between 2002 and 2010. The number of classes is unbalanced across years due to new drugs and classes
with all agencies exiting the market. 2 Among 1,214 class-year, there are 557 classes have only one drug
in a given year, and there is no conflict in such classes. In producing statistics for conflict, I only focus on
657 class-year with two or more drugs in a given class-year. There are 322 class-year with actual conflicts.
3 A “conflict relationship” is one among multiple drugs in a class-year that hire the same agency, or one
that an agency serves multiple drugs in a same class-year.
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Table 2: Turnover of Matches
Year # of Matches # of New Matches New% # End Matches1 End%
2002 586 225 38.4% 150 25.6%
2003 651 187 28.7% 195 30.0%
2004 635 179 28.2% 154 24.3%
2005 715 227 31.7% 176 24.6%
2006 779 225 28.9% 248 31.8%
2007 731 202 27.6% 208 28.5%
2008 734 184 25.1% 204 27.8%
2009 673 148 22.0% 171 25.4%
2010 631 128 20.3% . .
1 # of end matches is the number of matches that are in their the last year of the relationship.
Note: This table pools all matches together regardless of markets to examine the turnover rate of matches
overall.
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Advertising Agency and Drug Characteristics
Matched1 Unmatched1
Variables Mean StdDev Mean StdDev
Advertising Agency Characteristics
Billings(millions) 475 999.0 418 944.0
#Employees 342.2 667.4 338.7 739.1
Agency Age in # of Years 29.2 20.1 28.2 20.2
TV Specialty 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
DTC Specialty 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
Health Specialty 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4
Drug Characteristics
DTCA Expenditure (million) 9.4 29.4 0.23 3.3
DTCA TV Expenditure (million) 5.6 20 0.09 2.1
I(Top 200 Sales) 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3
I(DrugAge < 0) 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5
I(0 Æ DrugAge Æ 5) 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.4
I(6 Æ DrugAge Æ 12) 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.4
I(DrugAge Ø 13) 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4
1 The “matched” column summarizes characteristics of drugs and agencies that obtain any match in a
class-year. And the “unmatched” column summarizes characteristics of drugs and agencies that does not
obtain any match in a class-year. Among all agency-class-year, 46.6% are matched. Among all drug-
(class)-year 66.3% are matched.
Note: 1 The table summarize characteristics of all drugs and agencies in the market between 2002 and
2010. The unit of observation is a drug-year, or an agency-class-year.
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Table 4: Probability of Matching for A Drug
I(Matchit > 0) I(Matchit Ø 2|I(Matchit > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(DTCAt) 0.0167*** 0.0116*** 0.00763*** 0.00414***
(0.00107) (0.00119) (0.00152) (0.00158)
I(DTCATVt) 0.0368** 0.0210 0.173*** 0.0550
(0.0162) (0.0233) (0.0294) (0.0359)
I(0 Æ DrugAget Æ 5) 0.326*** 0.336*** 0.0951*** 0.155***
(0.0184) (0.0205) (0.0258) (0.0281)
I(6 Æ DrugAget Æ 12) 0.250*** 0.182*** 0.113*** 0.116***
(0.0194) (0.0265) (0.0268) (0.0377)
I(DrugAget Ø 13) 0.114*** -0.0419 0.0208 -0.0258
(0.0218) (0.0348) (0.0295) (0.0508)
I(Top200Salest≠1) 0.00731 0.0516** 0.0708*** -0.00926
(0.0150) (0.0255) (0.0208) (0.0362)
Constant 0.378*** 0.439*** 0.243*** 0.280***
(0.0146) (0.0190) (0.0211) (0.0276)
FE – Drug – Drug
Observations 5,584 5,584 3,703 3,703
R2 0.1745 0.4616 0.0687 0.3573
Note: 1 Specification in Column (1) and (2) regress the indicator of if a drug is matched with any agency
at a given year on drug characteristics. Column (3) and (4) condition on the sample of drugs in years
with any match and regress the indicator of if a drug has more than one match on drug characteristics. 2
Categorical dummy variable I(DrugAge < 0) is excluded in the regression. 3 Standard errors are clustered
at the drug level.
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Table 5: Probability of Matching for An Agency
I(Matchjt > 0) I(Matchjt Ø 2|I(Matchjt > 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AgencyAget 0.000457 0.0189*** 0.00119*** 0.00833***
(0.000416) (0.00262) (0.000318) (0.00319)
Ln(Billingt≠1) 0.0174*** 0.0483*** 0.0138*** -0.00430
(0.00521) (0.0112) (0.00382) (0.0121)
Ln(Empt≠1) 0.0328*** 0.0117 0.00915* 0.0331**
(0.00697) (0.0164) (0.00539) (0.0164)
DTC Specialtyt≠1 -0.0621*** -0.209*** 0.0108 -0.0520
(0.0204) (0.0534) (0.0149) (0.0433)
TV Specialtyt≠1 -0.0408* -0.0723 -0.0195 -0.0770
(0.0209) (0.0513) (0.0155) (0.0525)
Health Specialtyt≠1 0.0976*** 0.175*** 0.0327** 0.0116
(0.0182) (0.0460) (0.0134) (0.0438)
Constant 0.504*** -0.0390 0.0949*** -0.0722
(0.0196) (0.0803) (0.0147) (0.0968)
FE – Agency – Agency
Observations 10,716 10,716 4,993 4,993
R2 0.0098 0.4722 0.0162 0.6152
Note: 1 Column (1) and (2) specifications regress the indicator of if an advertising agency is matched
with any drug at a given year on agency characteristics. Column (3) and (4) condition on the sample of
agencies in years with any match and regress the indicator of if an agency has more than one match on
agency characteristics. 2 Standard errors are clustered at the agency level.
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Table 6: Types of Pairwise Deviation
Parameter of Surplus function:





1 Swapping partners between two pair “, ⁄ /
2 Drug replacing an agency partner —, “, ⁄ Ÿc
3 Agency replacing a drug partner –, “, ⁄ –
Adding new matches
4 A new match added between a drug and an agency
that already have matches with others
–, —, “, ⁄ Ÿc,Ÿf
5 A new match added between a unmatched drug
and an agency that already have matches with others
–, —, “, ⁄ Ÿc, Ÿf
6 A new match added between an unmatched agency
and a drug that already have matches with others
–, —, “, ⁄ Ÿf
7 A new match added between an unmatched agency
and an unmatched drug
–, —, “, ⁄ Ÿf
Drop a current match
8 A current match is dropped –, —, “, ⁄ Ÿc, Ÿf
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Table 7: Descriptive Regression: Probability of a Forming Match












DTC Specialtyt≠1 -0.00881*** -0.00412**
(0.00279) (0.00205)
TV Specialtyt≠1 -0.0122*** -0.00314
(0.00294) (0.00220)






I(0 Æ DrugAget Æ 5) 0.00458* -0.000508
(0.00263) (0.00201)
I(6 Æ DrugAget Æ 12) -0.00244 -0.00467**
(0.00260) (0.00202)




I(DTCAt > 0) 0.0159*** 0.0107***
(0.00253) (0.00156)






Mean(I(Matchijt = 1)) 7.13%
Note: 1 This regression pools observations of all possible combination of pairwise matches in each class-year
and examine what characteristics predict current period match. 2 Potential conflict is defined by if a match
between a drug and an agency involves an agency that also contracts with the drug’s competitor. Since
current period matches are interdependent, we use potential conflict in the past year instead. Potential
conflict in the past year is defined as for a given drug-agency pair, if the agency contracted with any
competitors of the drug in the past year. 3 The probability of any pair to form a match 7%, so the
potential conflict and potential conflict reduces the chance of match 20-40% of the time.
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Table 8: Descriptive Regression: Heterogeneous E ect of Previously Matching Relation-
ships
Dependent Variable: I(Matchijt > 0)
PotentialConflictt≠1 -0.0133*** Matcht≠1 0.928***
(0.00123) (0.0279)
Ln(Empt≠1) -0.000385 Matcht≠1 ◊ Ln(Empt≠1) 0.0344***
(0.000547) (0.00689)
Ln(Billingt≠1) -0.00000205 Matcht≠1 ◊ Ln(Billingt≠1) -0.0114**
(0.000433) (0.00551)
AgencyAget -0.0000318 Matcht≠1 ◊ AgencyAget -0.00148***
(0.0000323) (0.000386)
DTC Specialtyt≠1 -0.00158 Matcht≠1 ◊ DTC Specialtyt≠1 -0.0329
(0.00155) (0.0206)
TV Specialtyt≠1 -0.00211 Matcht≠1 ◊ TV Specialtyt≠1 -0.0351
(0.00167) (0.0232)
Health Specialtyt≠1 0.00335** Matcht≠1 ◊ Health Specialtyt≠1 -0.0160
(0.00145) (0.0178)
AnyMergej 0.00522*** Matcht≠1 ◊ AnyMergej -0.0482***
(0.00148) (0.0161)
PostMergerjt 0.00600*** Matcht≠1 ◊ PostMergerjt 0.0137
(0.00213) (0.0194)
I(0 Æ DrugAget Æ 5) 0.00350** Matcht≠1 ◊ I(0 Æ DrugAget Æ 5) -0.128***
(0.00169) (0.0235)
I(6 Æ DrugAget Æ 12) -0.000873 Matcht≠1 ◊ I(6 Æ DrugAget Æ 12) -0.128***
(0.00160) (0.0238)
I(DrugAget Ø 13) -0.00708*** Matcht≠1 ◊ I(DrugAget Ø 13) -0.166***
(0.00162) (0.0265)
I(Top200Salest≠1) -0.00299** Matcht≠1 ◊ I(Top200t≠1) -0.0129
(0.00138) (0.0141)
I(DTCAt > 0) 0.00704*** Matcht≠1 ◊ I(DTCAt > 0) 0.0519***
(0.00137) (0.0139)




Observations 76,887 Mean(I(Matchijt = 1)) 7.13%
R 0.5417
Note: 1 This regression adds the interaction terms between indicator of matches previously formed and
characteristics of advertising agencies and drugs. The regression is trying to produce suggestive evidences
for what pervious formed matches are more likely to be continued. 2 This regression pools observations of
all possible combination of pairwise matches in each class-year and examine what characteristics predict
current period match. 3 Potential conflict is defined by if a match between a drug and an agency involves
an agency that also contracts with drug’s competitor. Since current period matches are interdependent,
we use potential conflict in the past year instead. Potential conflict in the past year is defined as for a
given drug-agency pair, if the agency contracted with any of the drug’s competitors in the past year.
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Table 9: Baseline Maximum Score Estimates
(1) (2)
Parameters L.B. U.B. L.B. U.B.
Ÿc(Conflict) 0.00235 0.00679 0.00026 0.03238
Ÿc(Conflict) ◊ Matcht≠1 0.17793 0.32090 0.07360 0.22472
Ÿf (FC) 0.18334 0.24986 0.11156 0.54223
Ÿf ◊  DrugMatch1 -0.00034 0.00000
Drug Characteristics
I(0 Æ DrugAget Æ 5) 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 0.00001
I(6 Æ DrugAget Æ 12) -0.00137 0.00197 -0.00101 -0.00000
I(DrugAget Ø 13) -0.01381 -0.00656 -0.26384 -0.00022
I(Top200Salest≠1) -0.00073 -0.00046 -0.00117 0.00070
I(DTCAt > 0) 0.00386 0.00609 0.00057 0.30943
I(DTCATVt > 0) -0.00046 -0.00020 -0.00101 0.30892
Agency Characteristics
AgencyAget -0.00019 -0.00009 -0.00909 0.00031
Ln(Billingt≠1) -0.01206 -0.00389 -0.02084 -0.00002
Ln(Empt≠1) -0.00423 -0.00120 -0.02943 0.01094
DTC Specialtyt≠1 -0.00348 0.00010 -0.04255 0.00084
TV Specialtyt≠1 0.00001 0.00005 -0.13799 0.00906
Health Specialtyt≠1 -0.00340 0.00420 -0.00166 0.01297
AnyMergej 0.00987 0.01209 0.00456 0.13832
PostMergerjt 0.00790 0.16711 0.00000 0.14076
Matcht≠1 bounds implied 0.69894 0.94476 0.75005 0.86697
OptObj 201,312 201,695
Total Ineq 221,044 221,044
%Correct 91.07% 91.25%
1 Ÿf ◊  DrugMatch measures value(cost) of an drug to add an additional match.
Note: 1 This table presents the main specifications of maximum score estimator. Specification (2) di ers
from (1) in allowing the matching cost to change with the number of agencies a drug hires. 2 L.B. and U.B.
represents lower and upper bounds of the 95th percentile confidence region. It is derived using subsampling
method. 3 Parameters are normalized by ||◊|| = 1, or that square of coe cients sum to one. Matcht≠1
is excluded for normalizing the sum of squares. Inference for freely varying coe cients is directly derived
from the subsampling method. For illustration, bounds for the excluded coe cient (impact of previously
formed matches) shown above are [(1 ≠ ◊̃lb)0.5, (1 ≠ ◊̃ub)0.5] where ◊̃ represents all coe cients other than
the excluded one.
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Table 10: Maximum Score Estimates: Controlling for Heterogeneous E ect of Matcht≠1
Parameters Lower Bound Upper Bound
Matcht≠1 0.8988 0.9910
Conflict Cost 0.0006 0.0099
Conflict Cost ◊ Matcht≠1 0.0898 0.3903






Het. Past Match E ect Yes
OptObj 201,395
Total Ineq 221,044
% Correct Inequalities 91.20%
Note: This table reports key parameters in the specification that includes interactions of indicator of
matches previously formed and drug and agency characteristics. The coe cients for the interaction terms
are all insignificant.
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Table 11: Parameters in Counterfactual Simulations
Parameters Value Parameters, cont. Value
Matcht≠1 0.8793 AgencyAget -0.0011
Ÿc(Conflict) 0.0064 Ln(Billingt≠1) -0.0038
Ÿc(Conflict) ◊ Matcht≠1 0.2465 Ln(Empt≠1) -0.0050
Ÿf (FC) 0.3319 DTC Specialtyt≠1 -0.0057
I(0 Æ DrugAget Æ 5) 0.0332 TV Specialtyt≠1 -0.0119
I(6 Æ DrugAget Æ 12) -0.0016 Health Specialtyt≠1 0.0004
I(DrugAget Ø 13) -0.2105 AnyMergej 0.0103
I(Top200Salest≠1) -0.0013 PostMergerjt 0.0877
I(DTCAt > 0) 0.0364
I(DTCATVt > 0) 0.0328
Calibrated Error Distribution Parameters
F (‘) = Ê1 1(x) + Ê2 2(x)
 1 ≥ N(≠0.7383, 0.0563)
 2 ≥ N(0.1819, 0.0024)
(Ê1, Ê2) = (0.1977.0, 8023)
Note: 1 The parameter in the upper panel is the midpoint of each parameter range in its 95% confidence
region according to results of the first column of Table 9. 2 The lower panel is the error distribution that
I calibrate 4 parameters of the distribution using four data moments: in each period, the percentage of
matches dissolving, the percentage of matches forming, the percentage of previously formed matches in
conflict, and the percentage of new matches in conflict.
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Table 12: Counterfactual: The Impact of Conflict on Equilibrium
Costly-Conflict1 Costless-Conflict1  (Costly-Costless)%
Total # of matches 5193.05 6068.99 -14.4%
Total surplus 2877.05 3205.59 -10.2%
Matches with conflict2
Number 1765.91 3106.76 -43.1%
Mean surplus 0.33 0.37 -11.5%
Matches without conflict
Number 3427.14 2962.23 15.6%
Mean surplus 0.67 0.69 -3.1%
Matches continued from t ≠ 1
Number 4220.52 4247.90 -0.6%
Mean surplus 0.68 0.75 -9.2%
Matches new at t
Number 972.53 1821.09 -46.6%
Mean surplus 0.01 0.02 -13.8%
Matches continued from t ≠ 1 & with conflict
Number 1118.84 1481.06 -24.5%
Matches new at t & with conflict
Number 647.07 1625.70 -60.2%
Crowded Out Matches3 (rij = yij ≠ Ÿf + ‘ij)
0 < rij < Ÿc,ij
Number 214.27 0 -
Mean surplus 0.01 - -
rij > Ÿc,ij
Number 661.67 0 -
Mean surplus 0.02 - -
1 I simulate two scenarios using characteristics of the agents and their matching history as observed in the
data. The column “Costly-Conflict” assumes that there is an additional cost for an advertising agency to
serve two competing drug clients simultaneously. And the column “Costless-Conflict” assumes that such
additional cost is zero. 2 “with conflict” describes the situation when two or more drugs in the same class
match with the same advertising agency in the same year. 3 rij denotes the net return of a match between
drug i and advertiser j without taking into account the cost of conflict. In the rij expression, yij is the
return of a pair of match, Ÿf is the fixed cost of matching, common to all matches. Ÿc,ij is the cost of
conflict incurred to the match itself, and ‘ij is the random shock of the match surplus.
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Table 13: Counterfactual: The Impact of Mergers on Equilibrium
With-Merger1 Without-Merger1  (With-Without)%
Total # of matches 84.352 88.164 -4.3%
Total surplus 31.3877 33.7157 -6.9%
Matches with conflict2
Number 71.39 54.428 31.2%
Mean surplus 0.3291 0.2415 36.3%
Matches without conflict2
Number 12.962 33.736 -61.6%
Mean surplus 0.6105 0.6107 0.0%
Matches continued from t ≠ 1
Number 50.92 50.918 0.0%
Mean surplus 0.6089 0.6533 -6.8%
Matches new at t
Number 33.432 37.246 -10.2%
Mean surplus 0.0119 0.0125 -4.8%
Matches continued from t ≠ 1 & with conflict
Number 40.982 24.33 68.4%
Matches new at t & with conflict
Number 30.408 30.098 1.0%
Crowded Out Matches3 (rij = yij ≠ Ÿf + ‘ij)
0 < rij < Ÿc,ij
Number 2.376 1.478 60.8%
Mean surplus 0.0275 0.0144 91.0%
rij > Ÿc,ij
Number 15.69 24.526 -36.0%
Mean surplus 0.0167 0.0156 7.1%
1 I simulate two scenarios using characteristics of the agents and their matching history as observed in the
data. The column “With-Merger” simulates matches that will form in 2010 if PHCG and CDM merge.
And the column “Without-Merger” simulates matches that will form in 2010 if PHCG and CDM do not
merge. 2 “with conflict” describes the situation when two or more drugs in the same class match with the
same advertising agency in the same year. 3 rij denotes the net return of a match between drug i and
advertiser j without taking into account the cost of conflict. In the rij expression, yij is the return of a
pair of match, Ÿf is the fixed cost of matching, common to all matches. Ÿc,ij is the cost of conflict incurred
to the match itself, and ‘ij is the random shock of the match surplus.
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Chapter 3 – Consumer Protection or Consumer Frustration? The
Impact of Banning Foreign Pharmacies from Sponsored Search
3.1 Introduction
The Internet has led to a dramatic increase in the number of retailers available to
consumers in many industries. The proliferation of competition may benefit consumers in
several ways including lower prices. However, there is also the concern that the quality
of the new product o erings may be lower, though di cult to discern by consumers. The
concern is particularly acute for online prescription drugs, a market where poor product
quality may lead to adverse health outcomes.
The high price of brand name prescription drugs has motivated US consumers to
search for cheaper supplies from foreign pharmacies, despite the fact that personal im-
portation is illegal. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) prohibits
the importation of unapproved drugs into the US.33 In particular, section 355(a) states:
“No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new
drug, unless an approval of an application ... is e ective with respect to such drug.”34
The FDA further states that interstate shipment includes importation and the FD&C Act
applies to “any drugs, including foreign-made versions of U.S. approved drugs, that have







Based on data from IMS Health, Skinner (2006) estimated that sales to US con-
sumers from 278 confirmed or suspected Canadian-based Internet pharmacies reached
CDN$507 million in the 12 month periods ending June 2005.36 More than half of the
sales were on top-selling brand-name prescription drugs consumed primarily by seniors.
According to Skinner (2005), Canadian prices for the 100 top-selling brand-name drugs
were on average 43% below US prices for the same drugs. Consistently, Quon et al. (2005)
compared 12 Canadian Internet pharmacies with 3 major online US drug chain pharmacies
and found that Americans can save an average of approximately 24% per unit of drug if
they purchase the 44 most-commonly purchased brand-name medications from Canada.
The large price di erence between US and Canada has motivated not only individual
Americans to order brand name prescription drugs from foreign pharmacies but also a
large number of bills introduced by state or federal legislators in favor of legalizing or
facilitating the cross-border drug trade with Canada.37
While drug sales from foreign pharmacies have been growing, the National Associ-
ation of Boards of Pharmacy (NABP) emphasizes the illegality of buying foreign drugs
and highlights the danger of rogue pharmacies. In particular, NABP (2011) reviewed
7,430 Internet pharmacies as of December 2010 and found 96.02% of them operating out
of compliance with US state and federal laws and/or NABP patient safety and pharmacy
practice standards. Among these non-NABP-recommended pharmacies, 2,429 (34%) had
server locations in a foreign country, 1,944 (27%) had a physical address out of US, 4,005
(56%) did not provide any physical address, 5,982 (84%) did not require a valid prescrip-
tion, 4,397 (62%) issued prescriptions via online consultation, 3,210 (50%) o ered foreign
36This number was measured in standardized manufacturer-level prices and did not include “foot tra c”
sales to US consumers through regular “brick-and-mortar” border pharmacies in Canada. Sales measured
by final retail prices to US customers was not available but is certainly higher than CDN$507.
37According to Skinner (2006), the number of state and federal bills on this topic increased from 3 in
2002 to 84 in 2005.
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or non-FDA-approved drugs, 5,928 (83%) did not o er medical consultation, and 1,129
(16%) did not have secure sites. Independent research, mostly from medical researchers
rather than economists, confirmed some of the NABP concerns, although the data gath-
ered for these studies were often of a much smaller sample size. In particular, Orizio et
al. (2011) reviewed 193 articles about Internet pharmacies, of which 76 were based on
original data. The articles with original data suggested that geographic characteristics
were concealed in many websites, at least some websites sold drugs without a prescription
and an online questionnaire was a frequent tool used to replace a prescription. On drug
quality, researchers often found inappropriate packaging and labeling, however, the chem-
ical composition was found to di er from what is ordered in only a minority of studied
samples.
Internet search engines, such as Google, are one avenue consumers use to reach In-
ternet pharmacies. Upon submitting a query, a user is presented with two types of results.
The first are organic results whose ranks are solely a function of search engine’s relevance
algorithm. The second type are called paid or sponsored links, which appear based on
both the relevance of the link to the query and a monetary bid placed by the owner of the
link. If the user clicks on a sponsored link, the link owner pays the search engine their
bid. An example of a Google search results page is shown in Figure 1. Because of height-
ened concern to protect consumers, Google agreed to ban non-NABP-certified pharmacies
from their sponsored search listings in February 2010. Eighteen months later (August
24, 2011), Google settled with the US Department of Justice (DOJ) by “forfeiting $500
million generated by online ads & prescription sales by Canadian online pharmacies.”38
38http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/August/11-dag-1078.html, retrieved December 28, 2013.
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At first glance, the ban is a form of a minimum quality standard. Both Leland
(1979) and Shapiro (1986) showed that a minimum quality standard (and its variant
forms such as occupational licensing) can eliminate poor quality products, encourage high
quality sellers to enter the market, and expand consumer demand because consumers
anticipate higher quality under the regulation. These e ects tend to benefit consumers
who appreciate high quality. However, a minimum quality standard can also increase
barriers to entry and reduce competition (Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976)). Even if the
standard improves average quality on the market, it raises the market price and potentially
hurts price-sensitive consumers by denying them access to low quality products. If the
minimum quality standard is set by the industry, the harm can be even greater as the
industry has incentives to set too high a standard in order to reduce competition (Leland,
1979).
A number of empirical studies have attempted to test the theory of minimum qual-
ity standards by examining price, quantity, quality, and market structure, but all of them
assumed that the standard is well enforced in reality.39 This assumption does not hold for
online pharmacies: after the ban, consumers can still access non-NABP-certified pharma-
cies through organic search.40 Moreover, the ban contains only limited safety information
on specific online pharmacies and consumers can gather safety information through other
39Law and Kim (2005) explored the e ects of occupational licensing in the Progressive Era and showed
that the licensing regulation had improved markets when consumers faced increasing di culty in judging
the quality of professional services. Law and Marks (2009) examined the introduction of state-level licensing
regulation during the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries and found that licensing laws often helped
female and black workers, particularly in occupations where worker quality was hard to ascertain. On the
negative side, Pashigian (1979) reported that state-specific occupational licensing had a quantitatively
large e ect in reducing the interstate mobility of professionals; Shepard (1978) estimated that the price
of dental services and mean dentist income were between 12 and 15 percent higher in non-reciprocity
jurisdictions when other factors are accounted for; Adams et al. (2003) compared state-by-state regulation
on midwifery licensing and found that more stringent licensing regulation led to fewer births by midwifery,
which led them to conclude that licensing regulation had a detrimental e ect by restricting entry and
competition.
40Organic search refers to links returned by a search engine due to their relevance to the search terms
and not due to an advertising campaign by the link owner. In contrast, paid or sponsored search refers to
links returned by a search engine as a result of both relevance to the search terms and advertising.
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channels. Other channels of information includes consumer experience, word of mouth,
and alternative certification agencies. Specifically, Google used a private certification
agency – PharmacyChecker.com – to filter rogue pharmacies before the ban. This aban-
doned practice is more lenient than the ban because PharmacyChecker certifies both US
and foreign pharmacies while NABP automatically disqualifies any foreign pharmacies.41
Even after the ban, Google uses the Canadian Internet Pharmacy Association (CIPA) to
screen sponsored ads that target Canadian consumers, but the CIPA-certified pharmacies
are not NABP-certified for US customers because they are foreign. According to Leland
(1979) and Shapiro (1986), one welfare loss from a minimum quality standard is the denial
of low quality products to price-sensitive consumers. With organic links and alternative
information channels, this denial is likely incomplete for online pharmacies, which o ers
us an excellent opportunity to study how pharmacies comply with the minimum quality
standard coexist or even compete with non-NABP-certified pharmacies. A few papers
have examined the e ect of tighter law enforcement restricting illicit drugs such as heroin
and cocaine, but all of them focus on price, production, or crime rather than search activ-
ities on the consumer side.42 Our results on consumer search will shed new light on the
interaction between two competing marketplaces: one legal (NABP-certified pharmacies)
and one illegal (non-NABP-certified pharmacies).
41In this sense, Google adoption of the NABP standard is similar to a switch from certification to
a minimum quality standard, on which Shapiro (1986) argued that certification can be more welfare-
improving because it allows the whole spectrum of quality to be known and available to consumers.
42Via a theoretical model, Becker et al. (2006) showed that optimal enforcement on illegal drug suppliers
depend on demand and supply elasticities. When demand and supply are not too elastic, it does not pay to
enforce any prohibition unless the social value of drug consumption is negative. Dobkin & Nicosia (2009)
examined a large and abrupt government intervention in the supply of methamphetamine. They found that
the intervention had a large e ect in increasing the price of methamphetamine sold illegally, in reducing
related hospital and treatment admissions, and in reducing arrests related to methamphetamine use; but
all these e ects were temporary. Miron (2003) also found that cocaine and heroin were substantially more
expensive than they would be in a legalized market. Looking at the problem in an opposite direction,
Chaudhuri et al. (2003) examined how the WTO enforcement of pharmaceutical patents would a ect
the Indian market of Quinolones. They estimated that the withdrawal of all domestic products in this
segment was associated with substantial welfare losses to the Indian economy, even in the presence of price
regulation and the overwhelming portion of this welfare loss derived from the loss of consumer welfare.
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How easy is it to switch to organic links when sponsored links of the same website
are no longer available? A rising literature has shown that sponsored links accounted for
15% of all clicks (Jansen et al., 2007), consumers had a preference against sponsored links
(Jansen and Resnick 2006), consumers appreciated sponsored links as advertisements if
they were relevant (Jansen et al., 2007), and organic and sponsored links from the same
website of a national retailer were complements in consumer clicks (S. Yang & Ghose,
2010). Two studies released by Google painted a somewhat di erent picture. Chan, et
al. (2012) found that 81% of sponsored impressions and 66% of sponsored clicks occurred
in the absence of an associated organic link on the first page of search results. This
suggests that most sponsored links are from websites that are not easy to find in organic
search. Chan et al. (2012) examined 446 incidences where sponsored ads were paused
between October, 2010 to March, 2011. From these incidences, they found that 89% of
the tra c generated by sponsored ads was not replaced by organic clicks (leading to the
same destination website) when the ads were paused. This suggests that organic and
sponsored tra c are not necessarily substitutes. If many non-NABP-certified pharmacies
do not appear in high ranked organic results, the ban of their appearance in sponsored
listings could be an e ective tool to minimize consumer clicks on them in organic search.
It is worth noting that the organic-sponsored substitution is not necessarily the
only margin for the ban to take e ect. The ban could have other market-wide e ects
depending on how consumers digest the information conveyed by the ban. Apparently,
the ban tells consumers that NABP-certified pharmacies are believed to be safer than
non-NABP-certified pharmacies, and this message should be more salient after the Google-
DOJ settlement. However, the ban may also send an indirect message about the overall
danger of the online prescription drug market, or inform consumers that some alternative
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and potentially cheaper pharmacies exist although they are not allowed to advertise in
sponsored search. Moreover, the ban groups all other certified pharmacies with uncertified
pharmacies, making it more di cult for consumers to di erentiate quality among the
non-NBAP-certified websites. These economic forces, as well as the technical di culty of
substituting sponsored clicks for organic clicks, may a ect consumer search in di erent
directions. This leaves the net e ect and the source of the net e ect an empirical question.
Overall, the goal of this study is to examine how consumer search on the Internet
changes after the ban of non-NABP-certified pharmacies from sponsored advertising. In
particular, we classify pharmacy sites into three tiers: NABP-certified (tier-A), other-
certified (tier-B), and uncertified (tier-C). NABP-certified sites refer to US pharmacies
that receive approval from NABP or the NABP-endorsed certifier, LegitScript.43 By
search engines’ policy, they are free to advertise in sponsored search listings before and
after the ban. Other-certified sites refer to foreign or domestic pharmacies that are cer-
tified by PharmacyChecker.com or CIPA, but not by NABP or LegitScript. All the rest
are classified as uncertified sites. Although both other-certified and uncertified sites are
banned from Google’s sponsored search after February 2010, we distinguish them for two
reasons: first, uncertified sites were prohibited from sponsored listings even before the ban,
but the screening was imperfect. In comparison, other-certified websites were allowed to
bid for sponsored ads until the ban. Second, other-certified sites are subject to di erent
safety information in the eyes of consumers and therefore the ban could have di erent
e ects on them as compared to the other two types of pharmacy sites.
Using 2008-2012 comScore data, we find that the banned pharmacies experience a
reduction in the number of total clicks after the ban but the e ect is heterogeneous. In
43As detailed in Section 2, NABP endorses LegitScript to act on its behalf in screening websites for
search engines, so we treat approval from LegitScript the same as certification from NABP.
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particular, tier-B sites experience a smaller reduction in total clicks with some of the lost
paid click-throughs replaced by organic clicks. These e ects do not change significantly
after the Google-DOJ settlement. In contrast, tier-C sites receive fewer tra c in both paid
and organic clicks, and the reduction is even greater after the DOJ settlement. We also
explore whether the e ect of the ban depends on what drug names consumers search for
on the Internet. Drug queries that led to more clicks on non-NABP-certified pharmacies
before the ban are most a ected by the ban, but chronic drug queries are less a ected by
the ban than non-chronic drugs. Overall, we conclude that the ban has increased search
cost for tier-B sites but at least some consumers overcome the search cost by switching from
paid to organic links. In addition to search frustration, the ban may have increased health
concerns for tier-C sites, which explains why consumers are discouraged from reaching
them via both paid and organic links.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2, we provide background on the online
market for prescription drugs as well as changes to Google’s policy regarding sponsored
search ads from online pharmacies. We lay out our econometric framework in section 3
including a model we use to separate the e ects of the ban on consumer beliefs and search
costs. Section 4 describes the data provided by comScore and results are presented in
section 5. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 The Online Market of Prescription Drugs
According to IMS, prescription drug sales in the US has grown from $135 billion
in 2001 to $307 billion in 2010 (IMS 2011). A literature review by Orizio et al. (2011)
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found that the percent of general population using online pharmacies was often reported
to be between 4% and 6%. Although the percentage is small, the total volume of sales
can be huge. According to Skinner (2006), sales to US consumers from 278 Canadian or
seemingly-Canadian pharmacies reached CDN$507 million in the 12 month periods ending
June 2005. The US$500 million fine that Google agreed to pay in 2011 also indicates the
size of the online prescription drug market, as the fine is calculated by the revenue received
by Google for selling sponsored ads to Canadian pharmacies and the estimated revenue
that Canadian pharmacies got from their sales to US consumers.44
One major concern of online purchase is drug safety. As described in NABP (2011)
and Orizio et al. (2011), drug safety can be potentially compromised by a relaxed pre-
scription requirement, insu cient medical consultation, incorrect packaging and labeling,
wrong ingredients, or no delivery at all. Some rogue websites also aim to steal consumer
credit card information for identity theft. Although the FD&C Act prohibits the impor-
tation of unapproved drugs, when determining the legality of personal shipments, “FDA
personnel may use their discretion to allow entry of shipments of violative FDA regulated
products when the quantity and purpose are clearly for personal use, and the product does
not present an unreasonable risk to the user.”45 Therefore, a consumer who purchases a
drug from a foreign pharmacy for personal use faces some uncertainty regarding the likely
reaction by the FDA.
To address safety concerns, the FDA also publicizes anecdotes of unsafe pharmaceu-
ticals on the Internet and warns consumers against rogue websites (which could be foreign
or domestic). They also advise consumers to avoid any foreign websites and only make
44CNN report August 24, 2011, accessed at http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/24/technology/google_settlement/index.htm.
45See . The FDA defines personal shipments as containing no more than 90-days supply for personal
use and does not involve a controlled substance. A controlled substance is a drug that has a high potential
for abuse, does not have an accepted medical use, and/or does not meet accepted safety requirements.
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online purchases from the US websites certified by the NABP. The NABP certification
ensures that a US website comply with laws in both the state of their business operation
and the states to that they ship medications. As of February 29, 2012, NABP has certified
30 online pharmacies, 12 of which are run by large PBM companies (open to members
only) and the rest include national chain pharmacies (such as cvs.com and walgreens.com)
and large online-only pharmacies (such as drugstore.com).
Another private certification agency, LegitScript.com46, is similar to the NABP in
terms of only approving US-based websites and endorsed by the NABP to screen phar-
macy websites after the Google ban. As of March 5, 2012, the home page of LegitScript
announced that they monitored 228,419 Internet pharmacies among which 40,233 were
active. Within active websites, LegitScript found 221 legitimate (0.5%), 1,082 poten-
tially legitimate (2.7%) and 38,929 not legitimate (96.8%). Their certification criterion
includes a valid license with local US jurisdictions, valid registration with the US Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) if dispensing controlled substances, valid contract
information, valid domain name registration, requiring a valid prescription, only dispens-
ing FDA approved drugs, and protecting user privacy according to the HIPAA Privacy
Rule (45 CRF 164). There are more LegitScript-certified websites than NABP-certified
websites, probably because the NABP requires interested websites to apply and pay veri-
fication fees while LegitScript’s approval is free and does not require website application.
Because the NABP praises the work of LegitScript and endorses the use of LegitScript
by domain name registrars to assist in identifying illegally operating websites, throughout
this chapter we treat LegitScript the same as NABP and label websites certified by either
agency as NABP-certified.
46LegitScript was founded by a former White House aide named John Horton.
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The other two private certifiers – PharmacyChecker.com and the Canadian Interna-
tional Pharmacy Association (CIPA) – are fundamentally di erent from NABP/LegitScript.
CIPA is a trade association of Canadian pharmacies and only certifies Canadian websites
that comply with Canadian laws, while PharmacyChecker.com covers US, Canada, and
many other countries. Upon voluntary application (with a fee), PharmacyChecker cer-
tifies that any approved website has a valid pharmacy license from its local pharmacy
board, requires a prescription for US purchase if the FDA requires a prescription for the
medication, protects consumer information, encrypts financial and personal information,
and presents a valid mailing address and phone number for contact information. As of
March 9, 2012, PharmacyChecker has approved 73 foreign websites and 51 US websites.
PharmacyChecker also charges fees for an approved website to be listed on Pharmacy-
Checker.com beyond a short period of initial approval. Consequently, those listed on
PharmacyChecker’s Pharmacy Ratings page are only a selected list of PharmacyChecker-
approved websites. Because PharmacyChecker is unwilling to share their complete list of
approvals, we are not able to conduct a full comparison between approvals by Pharmacy-
Checker and those by the NABP, LegitScript or the CIPA. Of the 37 websites listed on
the Pharmacy Ratings page of PharmacyChecker.com, only three are labeled US while
all the others are either listed under one foreign country or a number of foreign countries
plus US. This list is incompletely overlapped with the list of approval from the NABP,
LegitScript and the CIPA. Among the four certification agencies, PharmacyChecker is the
only one that provides head-to-head drug price comparison across online pharmacies.
As detailed in the next subsection, Google used to contract with PharmacyChecker
to filter websites listed in its sponsored search page but switched to NABP/LegitScript
after it agreed to ban non-NABP-certified pharmacies in February 2010.
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Before we focus on the Google policy regarding online pharmacies, it is important
to understand why US consumers buy prescription drugs online. According to Mullner &
Gurau (2005), the most frequent reasons quoted by interviewees for buying or intending
to buy online were convenience and saving money, followed by information anonymity and
choice. Skinner (2005) estimated that Canadian prices for the 100 top-selling brand-name
drugs were on average 43% below US prices for the same drugs.47 Quon et al. (2005) com-
pared 12 Canadian Internet pharmacies with 3 major online US drug chain pharmacies and
found that Americans can save an average of approximately 24% per unit of drug on the
44 most-commonly purchased brand-name medications from Canada. In an audit study,
Bate et al. (2013) purchased samples of five popular brand-name prescription drugs from
NABP/LegitScript-certified websites (tier-A), PharmacyChecker/CIPA-certified websites
(tier-B), and websites that were not certified by any of the four certifiers (tier-C). After
comparing the purchased samples with authentic versions, they found similar drug qual-
ity between tier-A and tier-B samples, but the cash price of tier-B samples were 49.2%
cheaper than tier-A samples after controlling for other factors.48 These findings suggest
that a lower price for brand-name prescription drugs is an important incentive for US
consumers to shop online.
As for what type of drugs are purchased online, S. Fox (2004) reported that the
most frequently bought drugs were for chronic conditions (75%), followed by weight loss
and sexual performance substances (25%). Consistently, Skinner (2006) found resemblance
between the top five therapeutic categories used by US seniors and the top five therapeutic
categories in the cross-border online sales from Canada to US. This suggests that seniors
47This number has adjusted for currency equivalency. Skinner (2005) also reported that the 100 top-
selling generic drugs are on average priced 78% higher in Canada than in the US. This explains why most
cross-border sales from Canada to US concentrated on brand-name drugs.
48The price di erence was mostly driven by non-Viagra drugs. There was no significant price di erence
across tiers for Viagra.
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are an important source of demand for Canadian pharmacies. Bate et al. (2013) reported
an online survey of RxRights members. Because RxRights is a non-profit organization that
pays special attention to the cost of prescription drugs, their members are likely more price
sensitive than the general population. Among 2,907 respondents who purchase prescription
medication for either themselves or family members, 54.8% admitted to purchasing at
least one category of the drugs online at some time in the past year, 72.4% of online
shoppers purchased from foreign websites only, and an overwhelming majority (91.1%)
cited cost savings to be one of the reasons for buying from foreign websites. Surprisingly,
most respondents had medical insurance and/or some prescription drug coverage, and
the percentage of being insured was not lower among online shoppers. Comments left by
respondents suggested that incomplete coverage on prescription drugs, in the form of high
deductible, high coinsurance rate, or the donut hole of the Medicare Part D coverage, was
one of the factors that motivated the insured to shop online. The survey reported in Bate
et al. (2013) also highlighted how respondents searched for pharmacies. Conditional on
shopping online, 53.1% used Internet search, 40.4% checked with a credentialing agency
such as PharmacyChecker, 22.4% used personal referrals, and only 12.7% looked for the
cheapest deal. Consistently, most online shoppers restrict themselves to one primary
website, sometimes with supplements from other websites.
3.2.2 Google Policy on Online Pharmacies
As summarized in Table 14, Google used to contract with PharmacyChecker to
ensure that every pharmacy website listed in Google’s sponsored search page is legitimate
according to PharmacyChecker’s certification standard. Despite this policy, the FDA
found in July 2009 that some online pharmacies advertising on Google had not been
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approved by PharmacyChecker.49 Shortly after (November 2009), the FDA issued 22
warning letters to website operators.50 At about the same time (August 2009), a study
published by LegitScript.com and KnuhOn.com criticized Microsoft Bing for allowing
rogue online pharmacy to advertise on its search engine. The study found that “89.7%
(of the advertising websites) led to ’rogue’ Internet pharmacies that do not require a
prescription for prescription drugs, or are otherwise acting unlawfully or fraudulently.”51
While 89.7% is an impressive number, one should note that LegitScript emphasizes the
illegality of personal importation and classifies all foreign websites as unlawful. In contrast,
PharmacyChecker certifies foreign pharmacies and therefore some foreign websites that are
unlawful in the eye of LegitScript can be legitimate by the PharmacyChecker standard.
Figure 1 presents a screen shot of Google search page following the query “Lipton” in
2008. On the left hand side are organic links featured by brand-name website (lipitor.com)
and information oriented websites such as wikipedia.org. On the right hand side are
sponsor links, the top two of them are clearly foreign pharmacies (canadapharmacy.com
and canadadrugpharmacy.com). The manufacturer (Pfizer) also placed a sponsored link
of lipitor.com at the top of the whole page.
In response to the highlighted concern of drug safety, on February 9, 2010, Google
announced two changes regarding its pharmacy advertising policy. The first change is
to only accept ads from US online pharmacy websites that are certified by the NABP
and from Canadian websites that are certified by CIPA. The second change is that the
NABP-certified websites can only target their ads to Google users in the US and the
49http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/14/technology/14google.html?_r=0, retrieved December 25, 2012.
50http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm191330.htm, retrieved
December 25, 2012. The current FDA website hosting safety information of online purchase of drugs:
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/BuyingMedicinesOvertheInternet/default.htm.
51The report http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/08/20/internet.drugs/index.html posts the link
http://www.legitscript.com/BingRxReport.pdf, but it is unavailable to access on December 25, 2012. The
report is also available here: http://www.legitscript.com/download/BingRxReport.pdf.
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CIPA-certified websites can only target Google users in Canada. The new policy is only
applicable to US and Canada.52 Two months later (April 21, 2010), LegitScript announced
assistance to Google in implementing Google’s Internet pharmacy advertising policy in
place of PharmacyChecker.53 On June 10, 2010, both Microsoft and Yahoo! started to
require NABP certification for online pharmacy advertisers.54
In May 2011, Google announced in its quarterly report that “in connection with
... an investigation by the United States Department of Justice into the use of Google
advertising by certain advertisers, we accrued $500 million for the three month period
ended March 31, 2011.”55 On August 24, 2011, the DOJ made it o cial that “Google
Forfeits $500 Million Generated by Online Ads & Prescription Drug Sales by Canadian
Online Pharmacies”.56
Figure 2 presents a screen shot of Google search page following the query “lipitor”
in 2013. In contrast to Figure 1, there are no sponsored links on the page except for
lipitor.com at the top. The void of sponsored search on the right hand side is filled by
a drug fact label of lipitor with links to o cial information about the drug’s side e ects,
warnings and user guidance from the National Library of Medicine. The drug fact label
started on June 22, 2010 under a partnership between Google and the National Institute of





policy/. retrieved December 24, 2012.
54https://www.nabp.net/news/microsoft-and-yahoo-now-require-vipps-accreditation-for-online-
pharmacy-advertisers
55http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312511134428/d10q.htm, retrieved December 24,
2012.
56http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/August/11-dag-1078.html, retrieved December 24, 2012.
57http://venturebeat.com/2010/06/22/google-health-search-adds-drug-info-upping-pharma-ad-spend/,
retrieved December 23, 2013.
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In light of these events, we define three regimes for our empirical analysis as shown
in Table 15. Regime 0 refers to a 17-month period up to January 2010, right before
Google adopted the ban. Regime 1 ranges from March 2010 to July 2011, covering a
period after the Google ban but before the Google-DOJ settlement. The 13-month pe-
riod after the Google-DOJ settlement is referred to as Regime 2. Because our data are
monthly but both the Google ban and the Google-DOJ settlement occurred in the mid-
dle of a month, our sample excludes the two event months (February 2010 and August
2011). As mentioned in Section 1, we classify pharmacy websites into three tiers: tier-A
refers to NABP/LegitScript-certified US websites that are always allowed to advertise in
Google sponsored search. Tier-B refers to the pharmacy websites that are not certified by
NABP/LegitScript, but certified by PharmacyChecker or CIPA. All the pharmacy web-
sites that are not certified by any of the four certification agencies are referred to as tier-C.
By definition, only tier-C websites were blocked (imperfectly) from sponsored listings in
regime 0, whereas both tier-B and tier-C websites are blocked in regime 1 and regime 2.
Throughout the chapter, we use “NABP-certified” exchangeably with “tier-A”, “other-
certified” exchangeably with “tier-B”, and “uncertified” exchangeably with “tier-C”.
3.3 Conceptual and Econometric Framework
While consumers have many ways to reach drug-related websites, here we focus
on searches through search engines due to data limitations. For simplicity, this section
assumes that there is only one search engine available and therefore abstracts from sub-
stitution between search engines.58 Conditional on a consumer using a search engine, her
58Our data contain search and click volumes for each of the five largest search engines. According to
comScore’s new release, Google has a 64-67% market share in organic search during our sample period.
Because some comScore data on searchers are not engine specific, our empirical results pool all engines.
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search consists of entering a query in the search box and clicking into website link(s) of-
fered in the search results page.59 As detailed below, most clicks into pharmacy sites come
from queries related to pharmacies (e.g., canadapharmacy, pharmacychecker, or “cheap
drug Canada”), queries containing a drug name (e.g., lipitor), or queries related to health
conditions, drug manufacturers, drug regulators, etc. Organic and paid clicks are recorded
separately in the comScore data. To examine how paid, organic or total clicks change after
the ban, we assess the e ects on both the extensive and intensive margins using a two-
part model. 60 The extensive margin is whether a website receives any positive clicks in a
given month,61 while the the intensive margin is the number of clicks a website receives,
conditional on receiving some (non-censored) clicks.
Defining Y AllQueriesit as paid/organic/total clicks that website i received in month t,
we investigate the extensive margin using a probit regression:





—k ú T ierk +
2ÿ
r=1






◊kr ú T ierk ú Regimer
"
.
Tier and Regime are indicator variables for the type of pharmacy (tier A, B, or C) accessed
at website i and the time period to which month t belongs (regime 0, 1, or 2).
59We use the term “query” to denote the actual text the user enters into the search box on the search
engine and the term “click” to denote the subsequent clicks by the user on organic or paid links that result
from the search. The data include the number of times a certain query was entered into a search engine
and the number of clicks on each link, conditional on the query. A query with no subsequent clicks is
recorded by comScore as one query and zero clicks.
60The distribution of clicks per website is characterized by a spike at zero and a bell-shape positive
distribution skewed to the right, and the two-part model with log-normal positive distribution best captures
the data pattern.
61The number of clicks is coded as censored if the website receives too few clicks. We do not have specific
information on the censoring rule, so we code the censored clicks as zero. In one specification, we analyze
the extensive margin as whether a website receives any positive or censored clicks, and the results are
similar.
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where –i denotes website fixed e ects. Because website fixed e ects absorb the tier dum-
mies, T ierk only appears in the interaction with Regimer. We do not include website
fixed e ects in equation (1) because a probit regression with fixed e ects may introduce
an incidental parameter problem. In both specifications (1) and (2), ◊kr measures the con-
ditional di erential e ect of regime 1 and regime 2 for tier-B and tier-C websites compared
with the control group tier-A pharmacies in regime 0.
A priori, when Y AllQueriesit represents total clicks, one may expect ◊kr to be negative
for tier-B and tier-C websites after the ban, either because the ban has sent a negative
message about the safety of these websites or because the ban has made it more di cult to
find tier-B and tier-C sites even if consumers’ beliefs remain unchanged. The challenge is
how to distinguish these two explanations. One strategy is to explore the timing di erence:
arguably, the massive media coverage on the Google-DOJ settlement (regime 2) may
have increased the salience of the negative message about the safety of tier-B and tier-C
websites, while the di culty to find these websites should have increased in regime 1, right
after Google started to ban these websites from sponsored search. Moving from regime
1 to regime, consumers’ perceptions about the safety of the sites may have been a ected
by the settlement. This suggests that we can di erentiate the above two explanations by
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comparing the e ects of the ban in regime 1 and regime 2.
The second strategy is to compare the changes in total and organic clicks on tier-B
and tier-C websites. Because tier-C websites were prohibited from sponsored listings even
before the ban62, the ban should be a greater shock to clicks on tier-B websites than
on tier-C websites, if the main e ect of the ban is informing consumers of the danger of
other-certified websites. This implies that the organic clicks on tier-B websites should
drop more after the ban than those on tier-C websites. In contrast, if the main e ect
of the ban is adding consumer search cost in reaching non-NABP-certified websites, the
drop in the organic clicks on tier-B websites may be smaller than those on tier-C websites,
either because tier-B websites were on average easier to find in organic search (proxied by
their organic clicks before the ban) or because tier-B websites were perceived safer than
tier-C websites thanks to their non-NABP certification.
The above regressions summarize all search behaviors including what query to search
for and what link to click into. Assuming the ban has di erent e ects on tier-B and tier-C
pharmacy sites (which turns out to be true in our data), we can further examine which
consumer behavior leads to the di erence: is it because the ban motivates di erential
search intensity on pharmacy queries that spell out the names of tier-B or tier-C sites, or
because searchers are more or less likely to click into tier-B or tier-C sites conditional on the
same pharmacy queries? Taking tier-A pharmacy name queries as the baseline (excluded
from j), the e ect on query intensity can be studied in the following specification:
ln(Y P harmacyjt ) = –Pj + –Pt + —P1 · XPj · Regime1 + —P2 · XPj · Regime2 + ‘Pjt, (9)
62Paid clicks are observed on tier-C websites due to imperfect screening by the search engines.
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where Y P harmacyjt denotes the number of searches for pharmacy query j in month t.63 Xj
is a set of dummies indicating the type of query j. The coe cients {—P1 , —P2 } denote the
di erence-in-di erences estimates of how the two regimes a ect various pharmacy queries
as compared to the queries on tier-A pharmacy names.
As detailed in Section 4.2, we can distinguish pharmacy name queries (e.g. "cvs"),
discount pharmacy queries (e.g. "cheap drug") and general pharmacy queries (e.g. "phar-
macy at"). Di erent pharmacy query types may indicate di erent intention of search and
therefore respond di erently to the ban. To capture the e ect of the ban on clicks into
website i conditional on pharmacy query type j, let Xj to be the dummy variable for each
pharmacy query type, we extend equations (1) and (2) to allow key parameters {“r, ◊kr}
to vary by the type of query:
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The relationship between a user’s query and resulting click destinations sheds light
on the economic e ects of the ban. If a query for "discount pharmacy” directs more
tra c away from both tier-B and tier-C websites after the ban, it suggests that consumers
63We also estimate equation 9 using the number of searchers that submit query j in month t.
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have heightened safety concerns for all non-NABP-certified websites. In comparison, if
the query directs tra c away from tier-C sites but not from tier-B sites, it is probably
because consumers are willing to tolerate the risk of tier-B sites and/or find a way to get
around the ban of tier-B sites in sponsored search. Pharmacy name queries may provide
more direct evidence. If we find a tier-C pharmacy name query leads to fewer organic
clicks on tier-C sites but a tier-B pharmacy name query does not lead to fewer organic
clicks on tier-B sites, one explanation is that the ban has di erent e ects in conveying the
safety risk for these two types of pharmacy sites.
We also explore how the e ect of the ban di ers by the types of drugs consumers
search for on the Internet. Existing literature suggests that consumers that target chronic
or privacy-oriented drugs will be a ected the most by the ban because cost saving and
privacy are dominant reasons for using online/foreign pharmacies before the ban. Non-
NABP-certified websites may be more attractive for lifestyle drugs, either because users
of these drugs appreciate privacy or because they do not have a formal prescription and
prefer websites with a less rigid prescription requirement.64
However, as the ban cannot prohibit consumers from reaching non-NABP-certified
pharmacies via organic links, it is unclear whether the ban leads to more or less of a
click reduction for these drug queries. To examine this question, we classify drug queries
according to (1) whether drug query j attracted a high fraction of clicks into non-NABP-
certified pharmacies before the ban, (2) whether drug query j targets lifestyle drugs or
controlled substances, and (3) whether drug query j targets chronic drugs.65 Defining
64The term “lifestyle drug” does not have a precise definition, but one author describes a drug in this
category as “one used for ‘non-health’ problems or for problems that lie at the margins of health and well
being.” Of course, some lifestyle drugs are at times used to treat serious medical conditions. See Gilbert,
Walley and New (British Medical Journal, November 2000).
65For robustness, we also considered drugs for whom the searchers were more likely to be elderly or
low-income before the ban.
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each classification variable as Xgj , we estimate the di erential e ects of the ban on the
extensive margin of clicks into pharmacy site i from drug query type gj in month t (Yijt),
by:
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The coe cients of the interaction terms with Xgj , denoted as {“rg, ◊krg}, indicate
whether the ban has di erential e ects on clicks by the type of drug query.
3.4 Data Summary
Our primary datasource is comScore.66 ComScore tracks the online activity of over
two million persons worldwide, one million of whom reside in the US. ComScore extrapo-
lates the observed activity in the households it tracks and by using various demographic
weights, it determines the aggregate activity of all US Internet users. We obtained access
to click-through data from US households. ComScore data have been used to study inter-
net search behavior by a number of economists, for example, Waldfogel & Chen (2006),
66http://www.comscore.com/.
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Chiou & Tucker (2011), and George & Hogendorn (2013).
3.4.1 Click and Search Data
We use data from comScore’s Search Planner suite of tools, which provides click-
through data on queries submitted to five large search engines - Google, Yahoo!, Bing,
Ask, and AOL. The click data (available on comScore’s “term destinations” report) are
organized by query-month-engine and include the number of queries (searches), searchers,
and clicks in a given month. In addition, clicks are also broken down into organic versus
paid and by destination URL.67 At times, due to small sampling of some queries, click
activity is censored because comScore is unable to reliably extrapolate the observed ac-
tivity to the whole population.68 We observe 49 months of data from September 2008 to
September 2012.
In addition to click activity following each query, we also download from comScore
a demographic profile (comScore’s “term profile” report) of searchers who perform each
query in each month. The profile includes a distribution of age, income, household size,
the presence of children, and the geographic location of the searchers. We also observe
the share of clicks following a query that are received by each of the five search engines.
As an example, Figure 3 shows an example of these reports for Lipitor in January
2012. The term destination report lists the total clicks, divided between organic and paid,
following queries for Lipitor in January 2012. Because we selected “match all forms”, the
67A query is the actual text that a searcher enters on a search engine. Our data include click activity on
websites following the exact query, but also clicks following queries where the text appears somewhere in
the search box, potentially along with other words. Plural forms of the query are also included. comScore
refers to this as “match-all-forms” queries as opposed to “exact” queries that return the clicks on the query
text exactly as entered on the search engine.
68Our data has a limitation in regard to censoring. When a click count is censored by comScore, the
name of the website entity appears in the database with a click count of -1. This means there were positive
clicks on the website during that month, but extrapolation to the population would not produce a reliable
estimate. We treat these websites as having zero clicks in our analysis.
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click counts include queries for Lipitor alone as well as Lipitor plus other keywords. This
report shows clicks on all five search engines combined, but separate reports were also run
on individual search engines. The click counts under the key metrics section is comScore’s
estimate of the total number of clicks by users in the US on all websites following the
query. In addition, the clicks are broken down by specific entity.69 Each entity name is
also assigned to one or more categories, such as, health, government, or pharmacy. It is
important to note that the clicks we observe on an entity all originate from a search engine.
We do not know how many clicks a website receives via direct navigation, bookmarks, etc.
In addition, the term profile report provides information about searchers for Lipitor
in January 2012. While the report is not engine-specific, it provides the total number
of searches and searchers, irrespective of clicks following those searches. The report also
provides demographic information on the households that searched for Lipitor in January
2012. A few examples are shown in the table, but demographics are provided for age,
income, geographic region, location (home/work/school), household size, and the presence
of children. Finally, the report tells us the share of searches on each of the five search
engines.70
3.4.2 Query List and Website Classification
A list of queries must be submitted to comScore in order to extract query-level data.
To create a list of drug and pharmacy related terms, we use several resources. The first
one is a list of brand names from the FDA’s Orange Book of all approved drugs.71 The
69Usually an entity name is a URL, but comScore also aggregates clicks on websites with common
ownership and lists them under a di erent entity level (e.g., property, media title, channel, etc). We
collect click data at the finest level available to avoid double counting.
70From the share, we can determine the number of searches that were performed on each engine, however
the demographics are only available for searchers across all engines.
71http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm.
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second resource is a list of drug manufacturers from Kantar Media72 We also include three
government website names that provide drug information (FDA, NIH, and CDC), and four
website names that certify online pharmacies (NABP, LegitScript, PharmacyChecker, and
CIPA). The resulting list of queries is supplemented by the names of online pharmacies,
which is based on comScore’s own categorization of the websites in their data. Running
our list of drug names on comScore, we can identify the top pharmacy website names
in the comScore “Pharmacy” category.73 This list, plus any pharmacy names that we
can find on any of the four certifying websites, comprise our preliminary list of pharmacy
websites.
To address the possibility that searchers may reach drug and pharmacy related
websites by searching for a medical condition, symptom, or another non-drug and non-
pharmacy term, we supplement the query list with data from Keywordspy.com. This
website collects information on keywords that companies bid on for sponsored ads on a
search engine. It also reports a list of keywords that more likely lead to organic clicks on
a certain website.74 This allows us to identify a list of organic keywords that are popular
searches when the destination is ultimately an online pharmacy. We also add all keywords
that the FDA bid on to appear in an engine’s sponsored ads.
The combination of all these sources led to over 8,000 queries, far too many to
download from comScore given time constraints. Therefore, we restricted the list of drugs
to only those that were advertised (in the Kantar media data) and/or prescribed by a
physician from 2006-2009.75 We also ran the complete list of queries through comScore
twice on two time windows in 2009 and 2012 and restricted our sample to queries that
72http://kantarmediana.com/intelligence.
73The “Pharmacy” category ID on comScore is 778268. A website may have multiple classifications, but
any site with this ID we classify as a pharmacy.
74This is similar to the Keyword Tool in Google’s Adwords.
75The latter comes from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS).
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accounted for the top 90% of clicks in either window. This left us with 690 queries. Because
comScore reports the clicks both for the query exactly as it appears and variations of the
query (e.g., clicks following a search for “canada online pharmacy” are included in a search
for “canada pharmacy”), we only use queries that are not variations of another to avoid
double counting. This further restricts our sample to 528 queries. Each query was then
submitted to comScore and monthly reports from each search engine were downloaded for
the analysis.
Each of the 528 queries are then classified into di erent query types (see Table 16).
Along with drug queries, pharmacy queries are further classified according to their certify-
status (tier A, B, or C) as well as general and discount pharmacy keywords. Queries that
are not drug or pharmacy related are classified as other.
Table 16 shows the total query count in each category of query. Within each broad
group of queries (drug, pharmacy, and other), we further classify the queries by their
intention to search for online pharmacies. We expect that the e ect of the ban will be
most significant on the searches and clicks of queries that are used to reach non-tier-A
online pharmacies before the ban. In particular, for the pharmacy query group, we first
separate out the queries that are the exact name of the online pharmacy websites and
classify them according to the pharmacy tiers. Queries that target pharmacies that sell
cheap or discount drugs, and those operate in foreign countries, which more likely lead to
clicks on non-tier-A pharmacies, are classified into discount pharmacy search terms.76 The
remaining pharmacy queries are all general search terms for pharmacies.77 As discussed in
76Among 46 discount pharmacy queries, 11 contain words "canada, international and europe", 5 contain
words "online", 17 contains word "cheap, discount, low cost, free, deal, coupon".
77In the general pharmacy terms, there are three queries “pharmacy in”, “pharmacy on” and “the
pharmacy” carrying exactly the same observations, so we dropped the first two. To check if “the pharmacy”
counts all clicks from the query that contains only the word “pharmacy”, we calculate the total number
of clicks by all queries with “pharmacy” in it except for “the pharmacy”. We find that “the pharmacy”
always records a larger number of clicks and conclude that “the pharmacy” includes all clicks for queries
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the previous section, the sample of queries in our study are chosen if they lead to a su cient
volume of tra c that can be captured by comScore. Among 528 queries, we choose to focus
on drug and pharmacy queries because they are more likely to lead to online pharmacy
websites and thus better reflect the changes in consumer search behavior.78 Figure 4
shows that the number of searchers and searches evolve similarly by broad query groups.
Pharmacy search queries experience a spike in the last few months of each year because
some pharmacy queries include large retail stores (e.g., walmart and target) with seasonal
demand. We control for seasonality in robustness checks of our results.
The last step in processing the data is to classify the destination websites in the
database into various categories. We analyze the click data only for pharmacy websites so
we classify online pharmacy websites according to their certify-status (tier A, B, or C).79
The destination website classification is used in the results shown in the regression tables.
Because some of the comScore data are not engine specific, all empirical results
present below pool data from all five search engines.
3.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 17 summarizes the number of searches and clicks by query type. The ratio of
online pharmacy clicks to searches (column 3) is associated with the search cost of finding
a certain website. If the desired pharmacies do not appear in the paid links or high in
the organic results, this may lead consumers to not click on any website and subsequently.
with “pharmacy” in it. We kept the query “the pharmacy”, but subtract the from it the total number of
clicks by queries containing the complete word “pharmacy”.
78In regime 0, only 2.3% of the clicks on pharmacy websites are led from queries other than drug and
pharmacy queries, so we choose to not to focus on these queries.
79Since the search engine ban only applies to online pharmacies that sell prescription drugs, our analysis
restricts to this set of pharmacies. We cannot directly infer whether a pharmacy sells prescription drugs
from its site name or comScore classification, so we check by clicking into each pharmacy website to verify
that prescription drug is sold in the website at the time of our study.
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This would result in a low pharmacy clicks-to-searches ratio.
The ratio of pharmacy clicks to total clicks (column 4) show how paid and organic
clicks vary on each type of pharmacies led from di erent query types. Pharmacy queries
lead to many more clicks on pharmacy websites than drug queries. Tier-B names are
very likely to lead to pharmacy websites (93-98%) followed by tier-A names (78-81%)
and discount pharmacy keywords (59-67%).80 Tier-C pharmacy names are associated
with the lowest percentage of pharmacy clicks among all pharmacy name queries and
this percentage drops sharply from 39.8% in regime 0 to 31.4% in regime 1 and 7.1% in
regime 2. In contrast, the percentage of pharmacy clicks is stable or even increasing for
Tier-B pharmacy names after the ban. Compared with pharmacy queries, drug queries
have a much lower percentage of pharmacy clicks (22.1%) and that percentage plummets
after the ban (to 2-4%). This is probably because many drug queries target information
websites rather than pharmacies and the searchers targeting a pharmacy website using
a drug query cannot find the pharmacy sites via sponsored links following the ban. The
remaining columns of Table 4 report paid and organic clicks separately. The organic
clicks to Tier-B and Tier-C sites have increased after the ban for almost all pharmacy
and drug queries, suggesting substitution to organic results when sponsored links are no
longer available.
Focusing on pharmacy websites, Table 18 also summarizes the organic and paid
click volume on pharmacy websites by tier and by regime. For tier-A pharmacies, the
number of organic and paid clicks grows from regime 0 to regime 2. Tier-B pharmacies in
regime 0 are accessed mostly via paid clicks, with an average of 6,338 monthly paid clicks
and 1,795 monthly organic clicks. The ban results in almost 100% loss in paid clicks, but
80The average clicks per search and the percent pharmacy clicks are first calculated at the query level
and then averaged.
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part of the loss is o set by a large increase in organic clicks, suggesting that searchers are
substituting organic for paid links. For tier-C websites, the average number of paid clicks
falls as expected and the average organic clicks rises in regime 1, but then falls in regime
2, consistent with substitution to organic links in regime 1 and more awareness of the risks
associated with these sites in regime 2. The di erential change in organic clicks on tier-B
and tier-C websites is evident in Figure 5, where we plot the monthly trends of paid and
organic clicks by tier. Part of the reduction in organic clicks on tier-C pharmacies may be
attributable to fewer tier-C pharmacy queries after the ban, as shown in Figure 6.
The last three columns of Table 18 show the distribution of number of websites
active in each regime. With the same set of queries in each regime, the number of online
pharmacy websites that are recorded as having any clicks in comScore is relatively stable
for tier-A and tier-B pharmacies, but declines 33% for tier-C from 138 to 92. This decline
could be due to both health concerns and search costs. The decline in the number of tier-C
websites may have several implications. For pharmacy competition, this may benefit the
remaining tier-C pharmacies if consumers preferring tier-C pharmacies continue to buy
from them. However, if consumers are shifting from tier-C to tier-B or tier-A pharmacies,
we will observe clicks on tier-C websites decline as a whole.
The top panel of table A1 in the appendix lists examples of drug queries that led to a
high proportion of clicks into tier-B and tier-C websites in the first 9 months of our sample
(September 2008 to May 2009) before the ban. Five of the top 10 drug queries on list are
controlled substances. The bottom panel lists drugs with a low proportion of clicks into
tier-B and tier-C websites. Only one query in the tier-B list is controlled substance and
it also includes more drugs that target chronic diseases such as high blood pressure pain.
These patterns are not surprising as tier-C sites are less likely to require prescriptions and
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controlled substances are subject to closer screening by the FDA at customs enforcement.
In an unreported table, we also rank drug queries by the absolute count of total clicks
into tier-B or tier-C sites. These alternative ranks are similar to the ranks presented in
Table A1, except that some high-volume drug queries are ranked higher in the tier-B list
if they target chronic conditions (e.g., lipitor and insulin) or ranked higher in the tier-C
list if they target lifestyle drugs or controlled substances.
Overall, these statistics suggest a similar trend in searches across broad query
groups, but di erent click patterns into tier-A, tier-B and tier-C websites. In general,
we observe more paid and organic clicks on tier-A pharmacies, a greater substitution from
paid clicks to organic clicks for tier-B pharmacies after the ban, a reduction in organic
clicks for tier-C pharmacies as well as a reduction in search intensity for tier-C pharmacy
names. The drug queries that led to tier-B and tier-C clicks before the ban are also di er-
ent: tier-B sites were more likely to receive clicks from searches for chronic drugs, while
tier-C sites were more likely to receive clicks from queries for lifestyle drugs or controlled
substances.
3.6 Regression Results
3.6.1 Total Clicks from All Queries
Our first set of regressions focus on clicks received by pharmacy website i in month t from
all queries. As detailed in Section 3, this is our broadest specification and it summarizes
all search behavior leading to pharmacy websites.
Table 19 reports pharmacy websites clicks results for total and organic clicks. Within
total clicks, column (1) examines whether website i received any clicks in month t; Column
(2) examines whether website i received any positive clicks in month t, where positive
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clicks refers to non-censored click counts in the comScore data. Both columns (1) and (2)
refer to the extensive margin, following the probit specification in equation (1). On the
intensive margin, column (3) uses equation (2) to examine the log of the number of clicks,
conditional on a website receiving positive clicks in the month. Because click tra c of
many websites is too low to have non-censored positive clicks, the number of observations
drops 72% from columns (1) and (2) to column (3). The results for “any click” and “any
positive click” are similar, so for organic clicks we only report regressions for “any positive
organic click” (column 4) and log positive organic clicks conditional on having positive
organic clicks (column 5). All columns use tier-A sites as the excluded baseline group.
The first three columns suggest that, after the ban, tier-C sites su er on the extensive
margin while tier-B sites su er on the intensive margin. In particular, the probability of a
tier-C site receiving any positive clicks falls 6.69 percentage points in regime 1 and the net
e ect grows to 10.92 percentage points by regime 2. In comparison, there is no significant
change in the probability of a tier-B site receiving any positive click. Conditional on
receiving any positive clicks, the amount of total clicks received by a tier-B site falls
61.7% in regime 1 and by a similar magnitude (58.3%) in regime 2. Recall that the ban on
sponsored search was e ective in both regimes 1 and 2, but the Google-DOJ settlement
at the beginning of regime 2 had broader media coverage and likely heightened the health
concerns of uncertified pharmacies. The larger drop in tier-C clicks in regime 2, together
with the lack of a further drop of tier-B clicks in regime 2, suggests that consumers may
have had more health concerns with tier-C sites than with tier-B sites after the Google-
DOJ settlement. Another possible explanation is that tier-C websites were ranked low in
organic results and their organic ranks became even lower in regime 2 as consumers had
di culty finding them in regime 1.
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Focusing on organic clicks only, the last two columns of Table 19 show that tier-
B sites enjoy an 88.2% increase of organic clicks in regime 1 from regime 0 and 113.6%
increase in regime 2 relative to tier-A. Combined with the fall in total clicks on these
sites, this suggests that the loss of paid clicks on tier-B sites was o set with an increase in
organic clicks, although total clicks still fall. In contrast, tier-C sites su er a reduction in
tra c via both organic and total clicks, and the reduction is greater in regime 2 than in
regime 1. These di erential e ects suggest that the ban generates search frustration and
some, but not all, consumers switch from paid to organic links for tier-B sites. This does
not rule out health concerns for tier-B sites, but the Google-DOJ settlement may have
raised more health concerns for tier-C sites than for tier-B sites.
We also estimate auxiliary models to assess the robustness of these results. To
control for the possibility of a pre-treatment trend in clicks, we include a trend term
that was allowed to vary separately in each regime. We also checked for the impact
of seasonality by including a dummy variable for the holiday months of November and
December for tier-A sites. Neither of these specifications impacted the qualitative results.81
Because the ban on tier-B and tier-C pharmacies from sponsored links was imperfect (as
shown in figure 5), we also conducted robustness checks on the cut-o  date of regime 1
(the date of the ban) in two ways. First, we used a new regime 1 cut-o  corresponding to
the actual month when paid clicks on non-NABP certified pharmacies fell to nearly zero
(September 2010). Second, we performed a placebo check by placing the regime cut-o  in
June 2009, well before the ban. The first strategy does not a ect the qualitative results
and the second shows no change in organic and paid clicks in the hypothetical regime 1
treatment period before the actual ban. In the first strategy, we also tried cutting the
81Estimates for all robustness checks are available from the authors upon request.
101
regime1 into two halves corresponding to before and after September 2010.We find the
coe cients similar for these two halves, except that the drop of tierC websites total clicks
at the extensive margin in deepened relative to tier-A in the second half of regime1.
3.6.2 A Closer Look at Pharmacy Queries
We next investigate whether the click reduction on tier-B/tier-C sites is driven by con-
sumers searching less intensively for tier-B/tier-C pharmacy names or a lower likelihood
to click on tier-B/tier-C sites, conditional on a particular type of pharmacy query. To
answer this question, Table 20 reports regressions of log (searchers) and log (searches)
of pharmacy queries. Taking tier-A pharmacy queries as the baseline, we look into gen-
eral pharmacy queries, discount queries, tier-B queries and tier-C queries separately. The
only significant e ects in this table are the drop of searches and searchers in tier-C phar-
macy queries. The similar magnitudes of the e ect on searches and searchers suggest that
fewer consumers search for tier-C pharmacy names after the ban and even fewer after the
Google-DOJ settlement.
Table 21 examines how the ban changed total clicks into website i from a pharmacy
query of type j. We report the extensive margin (total clicks > 0) and the intensive mar-
gin (log(total clicks), if positive) separately. Within each margin, we organize columns
by destination: 1◊ denotes the baseline destination (tier-A), tier-B◊ denotes additional
e ects into tier-B destinations, and tier-C◊ denotes additional e ects into tier-C desti-
nations. The rows are organized by pharmacy query types: general, discount, tier-B and
tier-C relative to tier-A queries. The most noticeable result is that tier-B and discount
queries more likely lead to tier-B destinations after the ban but a tier-C query is less likely
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to lead to a tier-C destination. One possible explanation is that tier-B websites appear
high in organic ranks when consumers search for the tier-B names but tier-C websites are
ranked lower when consumers search for the tier-C names. Although we do not know the
exact organic ranks of each result in our sample period, we have searched tier-B and tier-
C pharmacy names in Google in 2013 and found the pharmacy websites appear highly
ranked in all cases. If the organic results in our sample period are similar to what we
got in 2013, this does not explain the di erential e ect on tier-B and tier-C queries from
our regression. These results, combined with a lower search intensity for tier-C queries,
suggest that consumers may shy away from tier-C websites due to health concerns but
are persistent in searching for and clicking into tier-B websites despite potentially higher
search costs.
3.6.3 Heterogeneous E ects of Drug Queries
Pharmacy queries are often associated with clicks on pharmacy websites, however we
do not observe which drug or condition the searchers are interested in once they click
on the website. In contrast, each drug query focuses on a particular drug, which is
suggestive of the drug cost, drug type, and searcher demographics, and allows us to explore
heterogeneous e ects across di erent drugs or across di erent types of searchers.82
The existing literature suggests that consumers tend to use online pharmacies for
chronic or privacy-sensitive conditions. Foreign online pharmacies can o er large cost
savings if a brand name drug is expensive in the US and consumers need it frequently.
Some foreign pharmacies, especially those in tier-C, o er online consultation and have less
82We are not able to explore heterogeneous e ects across di erent types of searchers for pharmacy
queries because the search volume on each pharmacy query is not large for comScore to provide searcher
demographics both before and after the ban.
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restrictive prescription requirements than pharmacies in other tiers. These features can
be attractive to consumers who are reluctant to obtain a prescription because of privacy
concerns or because of perceived stigmas associated with some lifestyle drugs. In light of
this literature, we explore heterogeneous e ects of the ban in four directions.
First, we characterize drugs according to what percentage of clicks before the ban
were on tier-B or tier-C sites. For a particular drug that had non-censored total clicks in
the first nine months of our data before the ban (September 2008 to May 2009, a total
of 233 drugs), we compute the fraction of total clicks into tier-B and tier-C sites. The
distribution of this fraction is very skewed, ranging from 100% (for two queries that only
led to tier-C clicks) to 0% (for 110 queries that only led to tier-A clicks). 79 drugs are
defined as H-drug if this fraction is greater than 3%, and 112 drugs as L-drug queries if this
fraction is below 0.1%.83 In the regressions for both extensive and intensive margins, we
take L-drug queries as the baseline and examine whether H-drug queries have a di erential
e ect on the interactions between the destination tier and regime dummies. The regression
sample excludes the first nine months of our data because they are used to define the H
and L drugs.
Estimates of equations (6) and (7) are shown in table 22. The results show that
H-drug queries are associated with a greater loss in clicks on tier-B or tier-C sites after the
ban. Specifically, H-drug queries experience more of a reduction in tier-B and tier-C total
clicks on the intensive margin. However, organic clicks for tier-B sites following H-drug
queries are una ected while they fall for tier-C sites.
In contrast to the recovery of organic clicks following pharmacy query searches after
the ban, the lack of substitution to organic clicks following H-drug queries is possibly
83The other 42 drugs had a fraction of total clicks into tier-B and tier-C sites ranging between 0.1% and
2.72%. We omit these queries in the regressions. Appendix Table A1 provides a list of the top 10 H-drug
queries and top 10 L-drug queries, ranked by the total clicks on pharmacy websites.
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because tier-B sites rarely show up as high-ranked organic links when one searches for a
specific drug. In contrast, tier-B sites often appear on the first page of organic results
if one enters pharmacy queries. These losses in total and organic clicks on tier-C sites
are larger and more significant after the Google-DOJ settlement, which is consistent with
the previous finding that consumers shy away from tier-C sites due to not only increased
search cost after the ban but also heightened health concerns after the settlement.
Our second analysis of heterogeneous e ects focuses on lifestyle drugs. We define
lifestyle drugs as those that target ED (5 queries), birth control (11 queries), weight loss
(3 queries), facial skin problems (11 queries), or smoking cessation (3 queries). We also
include drugs that are designated as controlled substances by the US government (23
queries).84 In total, 50 drug queries are classified as lifestyle drugs.85 As we expect,
lifestyle drug queries are more likely to result in clicks into tier-C sites before the ban.86
Taking non-lifestyle drug queries as the baseline, Table 23 reports regression results for the
di erential e ects of lifestyle drug queries. In general, the di erential e ect is insignificant,
except for a greater reduction in total clicks from lifestyle queries into tier-B sites on the
intensive margin and a greater reduction in total clicks into tier-C sites on the extensive
margin, both after the Google-DOJ settlement.
A third type of heterogeneous e ect could exist between chronic and non-chronic
drug queries. A drug query is defined as chronic if the drug was on average prescribed five
or more times a year per patient in the nationally representative 2010 Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey (MEPS). A query is defined non-chronic if the average prescription frequency
is below 3.5 per patient per year. In total, we have 73 chronic drug queries and 83
84Some, but not all, sleep aid, ADHD and muscle relaxant drugs are controlled substances.
85Appendix Table A2 provides a list of top 10 lifestyle queries and top 10 non-lifestyle queries, ranked
by the number of pharmacy-related clicks following each query.
86The fraction of total clicks into tier-C sites in the first nine months of our data is 6.9% for lifestyle
drug queries, and 2.81% for non-lifestyle drugs.
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non-chronic drug queries.87 Those with no representation in the MEPS data or with
prescription frequency between 3.5 and 5 are dropped from regressions.
Taking non-chronic queries as the baseline, Table 24 shows that chronic queries su er
less of a reduction in total and organic clicks into tier-B and tier-C sites on the intensive
margin. These e ects are larger and more significant after the Google-DOJ settlement.
In comparison, there is no significant di erential e ect between chronic and non-chronic
queries on the extensive margin. Because the intensive margin captures larger websites by
definition, this suggests that the ban has less (and in fact close to zero) e ect on clicks from
chronic queries to large tier-B and tier-C websites. These di erential e ects are impressive
if we consider the facts that the banned pharmacies have a low chance to appear high in
organic results following a drug query and the percent of clicks on pharmacy websites
following drug queries has plummeted from 22% to 2-3% after the ban.88
Our results show that organic and paid clicks on tier-A pharmacies increase after
the ban on non-NABP certified pharmacies. Total clicks on tier-B pharmacies fall after
the ban, though consumers substitute to organic links to partially o set of the fall in paid
clicks. Clicks on tier-C sites fall as well, and we find very little substitution to organic links
after the ban. This is consistent with health concerns driving consumers away from non-
tier-A pharmacies, though are still willing to click (potentially with higher search costs)
on other-certified tier-B sites after their ban. it is also consistent with the possibility that
tier-B sites are ranked higher than tier-C sites in organic results and therefore are easier to
find when sponsored links disappear from the search page. Our analysis of heterogeneous
87Appendix Table A3 provides a list of the top 10 chronic queries and top 10 non-chronic queries ranked
by the number of pharmacy-related clicks following each query.
88Although we do not present the results here, we also investigated if the average demographics of each
drug searcher had a heterogeneous impact on how the ban a ected clicks on pharmacy websites. We find
that the ban has no di erential e ect on queries that had on average older searchers or lower-income
searchers. These tables are available upon request.
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impacts shows that the e ects on tier-B and tier-C websites are larger for H-drugs, lifestyle
drugs, and drugs that treat non-chronic conditions.
3.7 Conclusion
We have shown that following the ban on non-NABP-certified pharmacies from sponsored
search, there is a reduction in total clicks into the banned pharmacies. However, this e ect
is di erential in several dimensions.
First, the websites certified by non-NABP agencies – referred to as tier-B sites –
experience a reduction in total clicks, and some of their lost paid clicks are replaced by
organic clicks. These e ects do not change significantly before or after the Google-DOJ
settlement. In contrast, pharmacies not certified by any of the four major certification
agencies – referred to as tier-C sites – su er the greatest reduction in both paid and organic
clicks, and the reduction is exacerbated after the Google-DOJ settlement.
Second, we explore whether the e ect of the ban depends on what drug names
consumers search for on the Internet. Drug queries that led to more clicks on non-NABP-
certified pharmacies before the ban are most a ected by the ban, but chronic drug queries
are less a ected by the ban than non-chronic drugs.
Overall, we conclude that the ban has increased search cost for tier-B sites, but at
least some consumers overcome the search cost by switching from paid to organic links. In
addition to search frustration, our results suggest that the ban may have increased health
concerns for tier-C sites and discouraged consumers from reaching them via both paid and
organic links. It is also possible that tier-C sites are buried deeper in organic results than
tier-A and tier-B sites, and the extra obscurity adds di culty for consumers to switch to
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organic links for tier-C sites.
Unfortunately, comScore data do not contain the rank information of search results
following a specific query. Hence we cannot distinguish the e ects of heightened health
concerns from organic rank changes after the Google-DOJ settlement.
More generally, our study is limited to consumer search via search engines, as
recorded in the comScore data. Due to the lack of individual click-through data, we do not
know whether a consumer switches between drug, pharmacy and other queries after the
ban of non-NABP-certified pharmacies from sponsored search. Nor do we know whether
the banned pharmacies have engineered their organic results or the NABP-certified phar-
macies have increased price or changed their advertising strategy after the ban. These
supply side questions warrant further study.
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3.8 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Google Search Screenshot, Before the Ban
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Figure 2: Google Search Screenshot, After the Ban





Match Option: Match Option: 
Key Metrics Key Metrics
Total Clicks 169,156 Searches 293,240
Paid Clicks 38,670 Searchers 219,414
Organic Clicks 130,486 Searches per Searcher 1.34
Site Clicks Demographics
Entity Name lipitor.com Wal-Mart walmart.com … Title HoH Age Income Region …
Entity Level Property Property Media Title … Level 45-54 $75k-99k New England …
SubCategory 778218 778230 778230,778281 … Reach 40.15 15.65 2.21 …
Organic Clicks 27,228 10,713 10,713 …








































2008m9 2009m3 2009m9 2010m3 2010m9 2011m3 2011m9 2012m3 2012m9
Month
Drug Queries Pharmacy Search Queries Other Queries
All Search Engines




































2008m9 2009m3 2009m9 2010m3 2010m9 2011m3 2011m9 2012m3 2012m9
Month
Drug Queries Pharmacy Search Queries Other Queries
All Search Engines
Monthly Trend of Searches by Query Type
Notes: The top figure plots the total number of searchers of each query type in each month. The bottom
figure plots the total number of searches of each query type in each month.
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2008m9 2009m3 2009m9 2010m3 2010m9 2011m3 2011m9 2012m3 2012m9
Month
Tier A Tier B Tier C
All Search Engines

















































2008m9 2009m3 2009m9 2010m3 2010m9 2011m3 2011m9 2012m3 2012m9
Month
Tier A Tier B Tier C
All Search Engines
Monthly Trend of Organic Clicks per Pharmacy Website
Notes: 1. The figures plot the total monthly paid and organic clicks of each tier of online pharmacy
website. The total clicks sum over all types of queries that lead to clicks on online pharmacies. 2. If the
ban on sponsored links has been perfectly implemented, we should observe zero paid clicks from Tier-B and
Tier-C websites in regime 2. The positive paid clicks on Tier-B websites are on “canadapharmacy.com”
in November 2011, and on “northwestpharmacy.com” in August 2012. The positive paid clicks on Tier-C
websites are from “freemedicine.com” and “albertsonssavonpharmacies.com”.
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2008m9 2009m3 2009m9 2010m3 2010m9 2011m3 2011m9 2012m3 2012m9
Month
Tier A Names Tier B Names Tier C Names
All Search Engines









































































2008m9 2009m3 2009m9 2010m3 2010m9 2011m3 2011m9 2012m3 2012m9
Month
Certifier Search Discount Pharmacy Search
General Pharmacy Search
All Search Engines
Monthly Trend of Searches of Each Pharmacy Query Type
Notes: The top figure plots the total number of searches for each pharmacy tier in each month. The
bottom figure plots the total number of searches for other pharmacy-related queries in each month.
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Table 14: List of Events
Time Event
before 2009 Google contracted with PharmacyChecker to filter out uncertified websites
July 2009 Some pharmacies advertising on Google were found to be uncertified
by PharmacyChecker
August 2009 LegitScript.com and KnuhOn.com criticized Microsoft for allowing
rogue pharmacies to advertise on Bing
November 2009 FDA issued 22 warning letters to website operators
February 9, 2010 Google began to ban non-NABP-certified pharmacies from sponsored ads
for US consumers
April 21, 2010 Google contracted with LegitScript to implement the ban
June 10, 2010 Microsoft and Yahoo! started to ban non-NABP-certified pharmacies from
sponsored ads for US consumers.
June 22, 2010 Google partnered with the National Institute of Health (NIH) and expanded
its search tool to include drug facts with NIH links. This is only available to
US consumers.
August 24, 2011 DOJ announced its settlement with Google
Table 15: Regimes
Regime Time Policy
Regime 0 September 2008 - Google used PharmacyChecker to filter online
January 2010 pharmacy ads
Regime 1 March 2010 - Google required NABP-certification and switched
July 2011 to LegitScript in place of PharmacyChecker
Regime 2 September 2011 - Google reached an o cial settlement with DOJ
September 2012
Notes: February 2010 and August 2011 are excluded because the imposition of the ban and the
announcement of the settlement occurred in the middle of these two months.
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Table 16: Query List
Query
Group
Query Type Count Examples Source
Pharmacy General Pharmacy
Keywords
6 pharmacy at Keywordspy.com
Discount Pharmacy
Keywords
46 cheap drugs Keywordspy.com
TierA Pharmacy Names 9 cvs comScore, cert. websites
TierB Pharmacy Names 13 jandrugs comScore, cert. websites
TierC Pharmacy Names 19 canadamedicineshop comScore, cert. websites
Certifier Search 8 vipps cert. websites
Drug Prescription Drug Names 263 lipitor FDA Orange Book,
Keywordspy.com
Other Drug Manufacturer 59 pfizer Kantar Media
Information/Gov. 5 fda comScore
Information/Info Sites 17 webmd comScore
Information/Health Terms 8 panic-anxiety comScore
Other Drugs/Non-Online
Rx
17 renvela FDA Orange Book
Other Drugs/OTC Related 58 prevacid FDA Orange Book
Total Count 528
Notes:
February 2010 and August 2011 are excluded because the imposition of the ban and the announcement

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 19: Regression Results: Clicks on Online Pharmacy Websites (from All Queries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
I(AnyClicks>0) I(TtlClicks) Ln(TtlClicks) I(OrgClicks>0) Ln(OrgClicks)
TierB 0.128 0.0990 -0.0780
(0.231) (0.253) (0.250)
TierC -0.534*** -0.788*** -0.895***
(0.159) (0.170) (0.168)
Regime1 0.0520 0.0158 0.176 0.0158 0.199*
(0.0484) (0.0450) (0.104) (0.0449) (0.108)
TierB◊Regime1 0.0960 -0.144 -0.617** 0.0114 0.882***
(0.160) (0.134) (0.253) (0.122) (0.245)
TierC◊Regime1 -0.230*** -0.260*** -0.140 -0.172** 0.130
(0.0769) (0.0897) (0.198) (0.0843) (0.186)
Regime2 -0.0231 -0.0871 0.151 -0.0924 0.146
(0.0747) (0.0692) (0.130) (0.0685) (0.121)
TierB◊Regime2 0.0668 -0.0384 -0.583** 0.149 1.136***
(0.171) (0.146) (0.255) (0.134) (0.255)
TierC◊Regime2 -0.480*** -0.424*** -0.0197 -0.323*** 0.247
(0.111) (0.127) (0.230) (0.119) (0.222)
Constant 0.0790 -0.189 9.043*** -0.194 8.508***
(0.141) (0.146) (0.0489) (0.146) (0.0484)
Marginal E ect
TierB◊Regime1 0.0328 -0.037 0.0028
(0.0546) (0.0345) (0.0302)
TierC◊Regime1 -0.0785*** -0.0669*** -0.0426**
(0.0251) (0.0228) (0.0206)
TierB◊Regime2 0.0228 -0.0099 0.037
(0.0583) (0.0376) (0.0332)
TierC◊Regime2 -0.164*** -0.1092*** -0.08***
(0.0378) (0.0329) (0.0297)
Observations 12,502 12,502 2,698 12,502 2,552
FE - - Website - Website
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
1. Dummy variables for Tier-A pharmacies, regime 0, and their interactions are excluded from the regres-
sion. 2. This table examines the di erential changes in total and organic clicks outcome in each regime.
Dependent variable in column (1) is if a website had any clicks, paid or organic, including censored clicks in
a given month. Dependent variables in columns (2) and (4) are if a website has any non-censored positive
total or organic clicks in a given month, respectively. Dependent variables in columns (3) and (5) are the
number of non-censored positive total and organic clicks (respectively) on a website when the number of
clicks is non-censored and positive. 3. Standard errors are clustered at the website level for all regressions.
4. In counting the total number of clicks into each website, we included clicks from all types of queries -
pharmacy queries, drug queries and other queries.
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Fixed E ects Query Query
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Notes: 1. Tier-A pharmacy names and regime 0 are excluded. 2. An observation is at the query◊month
level, and outcome variable is the log level of the total searchers and searches for a query in a month. 3.
Standard errors are clustered at the query level.
119
Table 21: Regression Results: Total Clicks on Online Pharmacy Websites (from Pharmacy
Queries)
I(TotalClicks > 0) Ln(TotalClicks)
Covariates 1◊ TierB ◊ TierC ◊ 1◊ TierB ◊ TierC ◊
Marginal E ect
Regime1 0.0078 -0.0498*** -0.0215** 0.305 -0.108 -0.230
(0.0063) (0.0254) (0.0146) (0.170) (0.311) (0.395)
Regime2 -0.0017 -0.0451** -0.0238 0.466** 1.925* 0.799*
(0.0069) (0.029) (0.0181) (0.147) (0.761) (0.323)
TierB Query -0.112*** 0.2005*** 0.0709** -6.382*** 7.578*** 6.809***
(0.0085) (0.0177) (0.0168) (0.779) (0.842) (0.923)
TierC Query -0.5412*** 0.5608*** -6.981*** 7.741***
(0.0135) (0.0063) (0.776) (0.679)
Discount -0.0644*** 0.2385*** 0.1635*** -4.294*** 6.898*** 5.832***
(0.0072) (0.0165) (0.0123) (0.998) (1.078) (1.039)
General 0.0375*** 0.14*** 0.0864*** -1.228 2.585** 1.639*
(0.0062) (0.0161) (0.0116) (0.725) (0.775) (0.783)
TierBQuery◊Regime1 -0.0289*** 0.0675*** -0.312 0.942
(0.0124) (0.0296) (0.238) (0.507)
TierCQuery◊Regime1 0.2878*** -0.2946*** 0.475
(0.0329) (0.0338) (0.626)
Discount◊Regime1 -0.0136** 0.0315 0.0143 -0.000350 0.155 0.0803
(0.0103) (0.028) (0.0178) (0.243) (0.442) (0.471)
General◊Regime1 -0.0081 0.0187 0.0029 -0.181 -0.0185 0.484
(0.0087) (0.0275) (0.0167) (0.184) (0.380) (0.422)
TierBQuery◊Regime2 -0.0539*** 0.0814*** 0.123 -1.254
(0.0165) (0.0349) (0.332) (0.721)
TierCQuery◊Regime2 0.002*** -0.0689** -2.351***
(0) (0.0339) (0.341)
Discount◊Regime2 -0.0229** 0.057** 0.0108 0.303 -2.456** -1.434**
(0.0116) (0.0318) (0.0216) (0.387) (0.766) (0.496)
General◊Regime2 -0.0071 0.003 -0.0291 -0.504** -1.944** 0.104
(0.0095) (0.0312) (0.0204) (0.170) (0.656) (0.435)




Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Notes: 1. We used a subsample of clicks on pharmacy websites following pharmacy-related queries. Dummy
variables for query type “TierA Names”, TierA pharmacies, regime 0, and their interactions are excluded
in the regression. 2. The regressions examine the di erential changes in the total clicks in each regime
from di erent types of pharmacy queries. In the extensive margin specification, the dependent variable is
whether a website recorded any non-censored clicks from one type of pharmacy query in a given month.
In the intensive margin specification, the dependent variable is the number of clicks on a website from one
type of pharmacy query at a given month, conditional on positive clicks. 3. Coe cients for the extensive
margin regression are in the first three columns and the intensive margin regression are in the last three
columns. The coe cients for the cross product with a TierB destination website are in columns (2) and
(5) and the cross product with a TierC destination website are in columns (4) and (6). 4. Some coe cient
estimates were not identified due to too few observations (e.g., comScore recorded no clicks on TierB
pharmacies following a query for a TierC pharmacy name). 5. Standard errors are clustered at the website
level for all regressions.
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Table 22: Regression Results: Online Pharmacy Clicks from H-Drug Vs. L-Drug Queries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I(Ttlclicks>0) Ln(TtlClicks) I(OrgClicks>0) Ln(OrgClicks)
Regime1 0.0095 -0.990 0.0046 -1.336**
(0.0077) (0.617) (0.0083) (0.591)
Regime2 -0.0088 -0.990*** -0.0071 -0.908
(0.0108) (0.566) (0.009) (0.748)
H-Drug 0.0593*** 0.0287 0.0437*** -0.00259
(0.0194) (0.397) (0.0166) (0.318)
H-Drug◊Regime1 -0.0223*** 1.204** -0.009 1.091
(0.0095) (0.524) (0.0081) (0.690)
H-Drug◊Regime2 0.0025 1.623* 0.0121 1.017*
(0.0167) (0.301) (0.0152) (0.312)
TierB -0.0104 -0.0957*
(0.0355) (0.049)
TierB◊Regime1 -0.0526** 1.324 0.044 0.173
(0.0249) (0.895) (0.0361) (0.691)
TierB◊Regime2 -0.0634*** 1.716 0.0392 -0.0910
(0.0263) (1.095) (0.0306) (1.073)
H-Drug◊TierB 0.0918*** 1.464*** 0.1206*** -1.622*
(0.0304) (0.819) (0.0425) (0.389)
H-Drug◊TierB◊Regime1 -0.0207 -2.425** -0.0624 0.734
(0.0247) (1.029) (0.0388) (0.817)
H-Drug◊TierB◊Regime2 -0.0377 -3.554* -0.0745** 0.620
(0.0272) (1.088) (0.0358) (0.842)
TierC -0.0806** -0.0797**
(0.039) (0.039)
TierC◊Regime1 -0.0348* 2.330* -0.009 2.845*
(0.0182) (0.859) (0.0173) (0.791)
TierC◊Regime2 -0.0563* 2.598* -0.0412 3.137*
(0.0308) (0.878) (0.0311) (0.936)
H-Drug◊TierC 0.0776*** 0.708 0.0816*** 0.630
(0.0293) (0.566) (0.0296) (0.531)
H-Drug◊TierC◊Regime1 0.0006 -2.727* -0.0189 -2.517*
(0.0203) (0.819) (0.0196) (0.901)
H-Drug◊TierC◊Regime2 -0.0145 -3.452* -0.0213 -3.320*
(0.0323) (0.799) (0.0341) (0.722)
Constant 7.668* 7.747*
(0.269) (0.245)
Observations 14,060 921 14,060 754
FE - Website - Website
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Notes: 1. Dummy variables for Tier-A pharmacies, regime 0, and their interactions are excluded from the
regression. 2. This table examines the heterogeneous changes in total and organic clicks in each regime
resulting from H-Drug and L-Drug queries. The dependent variables in columns (1) and (3) are indicators
if a website had any non-censored total or organic clicks in a given month, and the columns report the
marginal e ects of a probit regression. The dependent variables in columns (2) and (4) are the number of
non-censored total and organic clicks on a website when the number of clicks is non-censored and positive.
3. H-Drug and L-Drug are defined by their ratio of clicks into Tier-B and Tier-C websites in the first nine
months of the sample (2008/09 - 2009/05). 4. We exclude the first 9 months of observations from the
sample as clicks during that time were used to define H and L drugs queries. 5. Some coe cient estimates
were not identified due to too few observations. 6. Standard errors are clustered at the website level for
all regressions.
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Table 23: Regression Results: Online Pharmacies Clicks from Lifestyle Vs. Non-lifestyle
Drug Queries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I(Ttlclicks>0) Ln(TtlClicks) I(OrgClicks>0) Ln(OrgClicks)
Regime1 -0.0032 -0.207 0.0065 -0.713
(0.0176) (0.526) (0.0128) (0.555)
Regime2 -0.0173 0.00661 0.001 -0.515
(0.0208) (0.574) (0.0163) (0.596)
Lifestyle (LS) -0.0359* -0.308*** -0.0109 -0.320
(0.019) (0.171) (0.0082) (0.256)
LS◊Regime1 0.0257* 0.116 0.0066 0.174
(0.0151) (0.241) (0.0065) (0.319)
LS◊Regime2 0.0537*** 0.290 0.0231 0.376
(0.0211) (0.270) (0.0158) (0.253)
TierB 0.0955*** 0.0149
(0.038) (0.03)
TierB◊Regime1 -0.114*** -0.0200 -0.0278 1.863*
(0.0317) (0.621) (0.0218) (0.693)
TierB◊Regime2 -0.116*** -0.403 -0.0234 1.765**
(0.0394) (0.651) (0.0289) (0.791)
LS◊TierB 0.0041 0.557 0.0138 0.583
(0.0324) (0.366) (0.0285) (0.369)
LS◊TierB◊Regime1 0.0172 -0.681 0.0026 -0.646
(0.0305) (0.541) (0.0193) (0.708)
LS◊TierB◊Regime2 -0.019 -0.860*** -0.0236 -0.704
(0.0442) (0.484) (0.031) (0.526)
TierC -0.0436 -0.0332
(0.0346) (0.0293)
TierC◊Regime1 -0.0657*** 0.713 -0.0439** 1.291**
(0.0264) (0.568) (0.0197) (0.584)
TierC◊Regime2 -0.0588 0.474 -0.0512* 0.900
(0.0362) (0.644) (0.0278) (0.667)
LS◊TierC 0.0733*** 0.760* 0.0392* 0.613***
(0.0274) (0.283) (0.02) (0.349)
LS◊TierC◊Regime1 0.0035 -0.626 0.0171 -0.366
(0.0248) (0.470) (0.0189) (0.490)
LS◊TierC◊Regime2 -0.0656* -0.708 -0.0257 -0.437
(0.0354) (0.592) (0.0288) (0.633)
Constant 7.901* 7.390*
(0.141) (0.179)
Observations 18330 1439 18330 1064
FE - Website - Website
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Notes: 1. Dummy variables for Tier-A pharmacies, regime 0, and their interactions are excluded from the
regression. 2. This table examines the heterogeneous changes in total and organic clicks in each regime
led by lifestyle and non-lifestyle drug queries. The dependent variables in columns (1) and (3) are if a
website has any non-censored positive total or paid clicks in a given month, and the columns report the
marginal e ects of the probit regression. The dependent variables in columns (2) and (4) are the number
of non-censored positive total and paid clicks on a website when the number of clicks is non-censored and
positive. 3. Some coe cient estimates were not identified due to too few observations. 4. Standard errors
are clustered at the website level for all regressions.
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Table 24: Regression Results: Online Pharmacy Clicks from Chronic Vs. Non-chronic
Drugs Queries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I(Ttlclicks>0) Ln(TtlClicks) I(OrgClicks>0) Ln(OrgClicks)
Regime1 0.0142 -0.137 0.0178 -0.730
(0.0205) (0.746) (0.0174) (0.802)
Regime2 0.0259 0.178 0.0303 -0.544
(0.0254) (0.914) (0.0195) (0.901)
Chronic -0.0183 0.264 -0.0156 0.0257
(0.0156) (0.191) (0.0101) (0.370)
Chronic◊Regime1 -0.0025 -0.857** -0.0102 -0.553
(0.0094) (0.393) (0.008) (0.629)
Chronic◊Regime2 -0.0187 -0.742* -0.0169 -0.274
(0.0197) (0.278) (0.0128) (0.202)
TierB 0.0936*** 0.0292
(0.0376) (0.0333)
TierB◊Regime1 -0.1021*** -0.536 -0.0372 1.337
(0.0306) (0.801) (0.0235) (0.896)
TierB◊Regime2 -0.1339*** -1.079 -0.0563** 1.380
(0.0377) (0.953) (0.0258) (0.948)
Chronic◊TierB -0.0118 -0.640 -0.0221 -0.409
(0.0276) (0.428) (0.027) (0.479)
Chronic◊TierB◊Regime1 -0.038 1.558** 0.0006 1.228
(0.0233) (0.758) (0.0199) (0.900)
Chronic◊TierB◊Regime2 0.0134 1.373* 0.026 1.009***
(0.0364) (0.516) (0.0278) (0.520)
TierC 0.0143 0.0092
(0.032) (0.0276)
TierC◊Regime1 -0.0628*** 0.452 -0.0415** 1.209
(0.0265) (0.801) (0.0209) (0.850)
TierC◊Regime2 -0.1053*** 0.181 -0.0789*** 1.052
(0.0327) (0.948) (0.0245) (0.939)
Chronic◊TierC -0.0567*** -0.695* -0.057*** -0.323
(0.0239) (0.239) (0.0212) (0.419)
Chronic◊TierC◊Regime1 -0.0012 1.325** 0.0196 0.791
(0.021) (0.521) (0.0176) (0.730)
Chronic◊TierC◊Regime2 0.0295 1.877* 0.0283 1.158***
(0.0367) (0.438) (0.0265) (0.596)
Constant 8.035* 7.639*
(0.141) (0.154)
Observations 16920 1171 16920 853
FE - Website - Website
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Notes: 1. Dummy variables for Tier-A pharmacies, regime 0, and their interactions are excluded from the
regression. 2. This table examines the heterogeneous changes in total and organic clicks in each regime
led by chronic and non-chronic drug queries. The dependent variables in columns (1) and (3) are if a
website has any non-censored positive total or paid clicks in a given month, and the columns report the
marginal e ects of the probit regression. The dependent variables in columns (2) and (4) are the number
of non-censored positive total and paid clicks on a website when the number of clicks is non-censored and
positive. 3. Some coe cient estimates were not identified due to too few observations. 4. Standard errors
are clustered at the website level for all regressions.
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3.9 Appendix Tables
Table A1: Examples of H-Drugs and L-Drugs
Top 10 H-Drugs by Total Clicks
Rank Query Total Clicksa Tier-BC Ratiob May Treat
1 viagra 2,890,258 88% ED*
2 phentermine 2,140,199 52% over weight, controlled substance
3 xanax 1,866,525 21% depression, insomnia, controlled substance
4 cialis 1,056,012 87% ED*
5 oxycodone 829,212 5% pain, controlled substance
6 insulin 744,736 15% diabetes
7 ambien 697,907 6% sleep aid, controlled substance
8 e exor 656,777 6% depression
9 cymbalta 648,823 10% depression
10 oxycontin 553,726 16% pain, controlled substance
Top 10 L-Drugs by Total Clicks
Rank Query Total Clicksa Tier-BC Ratiob May Treat
1 coumadin 729,570 0% blood clots
2 metoprolol 516,298 0% high blood pressure
3 flexeril 409,765 0% pain
4 keflex 307,195 0% bacterial infections
5 skelaxin 243,452 0% pain
6 bystolic 224,755 0% high blood pressure
7 omnicef 184,677 0% infections
8 strattera 138,808 0% attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder
9 zyprexa 133,542 0% psychotic mental disorders
10 lupron 132,092 0% advanced prostate cancer
* ED stands for erectile dysfunction.
Notes: a Total Clicks is the total number of clicks on online pharmacy websites following each search query
from September 2008 to September 2011. The drugs in each category are ranked by this total number of
clicks. b Tier-B,C ratio is the percentage of total clicks from each query that led to Tier-B and Tier-C
sites in the first nine months of the sample (2008/09 - 2009/05). A drug query is defined as an H-Drug is
the Tier-B,C ratio is greater than 3%, and is defined as L-Drug when the Tier-B,C ratio is smaller than
0.1%. In total, we have 79 H-Drug queries and 112 L-Drug queries.
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Table A2: Examples of Lifestyle and Non-Lifestyle Drugs
Top 10 Lifestyle Drugs
Rank Query Total Clicksa Tier-BC Ratiob May Treat
1 viagra 2,890,258 36.6% ED*
2 phentermine 2,140,199 51.7% over weight, controlled substance
3 xanax 1,866,525 20.3% depression, insomnia, controlled substance
4 cialis 1,056,012 23.3% ED*
5 oxycodone 829,212 5.1% pain, controlled substance
6 ambien 697,907 6.4% sleep aid, controlled substance
7 oxycontin 553,726 15.9% pain, controlled substance
8 botox 420,769 0.7% wrinkle, face lift
9 levitra 367,965 13.9% ED*
10 soma 327,303 6.9% pain and sti ness of muscle spasms
Top 10 Non-Lifestyle Drugs
Rank Query Total Clicksa Tier-BC Ratiob May Treat
1 lexapro 1,053,639 0.0% depression
2 zoloft 817,323 0.1% depression
3 suboxone 811,330 1.6% chronic pain
4 insulin 744,736 1.0% diabetes
5 coumadin 729,570 0.0% blood clots
6 e exor 656,777 0.5% depression
7 cymbalta 648,823 0.3% depression
8 prozac 639,980 1.5% depression
9 synthroid 529,037 0.4% hypothyroidism
10 metoprolol 516,298 0.0% high blood pressure
* ED stands for erectile dysfunction.
Notes: a Total Clicks is the total number of clicks on online pharmacy websites following each search query
from September 2008 to September 2011. The drugs in each category are ranked by the total number of
clicks. b Tier-BC Ratio is the percentage of total clicks from the query that landed on TierB and TierC
sites in the first nine months of the sample.
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Table A3: Examples of Chronic and Non-Chronic Drugs
Top 10 Chronic Drugs
Rank Query Total Clicksa Tier-BC Ratiob Prescription Freq.c May Treat
1 lexapro 1,053,639 0.0% 5.5 depression
2 zoloft 817,323 0.1% 5.1 depression
3 e exor 656,777 0.5% 5.3 depression
4 cymbalta 648,823 0.3% 6.3 depression
5 oxycontin 553,726 15.9% 5.1 pain,
controlled substance
6 synthroid 529,037 0.4% 5.7 hypothyroidism
7 metoprolol 516,298 0.0% 5.7 high blood pressure
8 gabapentin 507,686 1.0% 5.6 seizures
9 pristiq 440,084 2.3% 5.0 depression
10 seroquel 438846 0.8% 6.2 schizophrenia
Top 10 Non-Chronic Drugs
Rank Query Total Clicksa Tier-BC Ratiob Prescription Freq.c May Treat
1 viagra 2,890,258 36.6% 3.2 ED*
2 xanax 1,866,525 20.3% 2.5 depression, insomnia,
controlled substance
3 cialis 1,056,012 23.3% 2.6 ED*
4 oxycodone 829,212 5.1% 3.4 pain,
controlled substance
5 celexa 459,163 0.2% 1.0 depression
6 flexeril 409,765 0% 2.2 pain and sti ness of
muscle spasms
7 levitra 367,965 13.9% 3.2 ED*
8 metronidazole 340,345 14.5% 1.9 bacterial infections
9 keflex 307,195 0% 1.5 bacterial infections
10 zithromax 295,800 45.6% 1.2 bacterial infections
* ED stands for erectile dysfunction.
Notes: a Total Clicks is the total number of clicks on online pharmacy websites following the search query
from September 2008 to September 2011. The drugs in each category are ranked by the total number of
clicks. b Tier-B,C ratio is the percentage of total clicks from each query that led to Tier-B and Tier-C sites
in the first nine months of the sample (2008/09 - 2009/05). c Prescriptions Freq.(frequency) is the average
number of prescriptions for each patient in a given year. It is calculated from 2010 Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey and is weighted to reflect the national representative statistics. When the average number
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